Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,793 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
906
306
118
108
97
Contributors
444
386
346
85
62
Categories
1,048
468
403
377
369
Platforms
1,572
128
100
89
54
Products / Services
733
484
148
100
76
MITRE Techniques
18,119
15,639
12,589
8,399
6,227
1,793
CVEs
6
5
5
4
3
IDS Classtypes
32
4
2
IDS Protocols
32
4
1
1
Detects the creation of executable or script files within non-system directories that were initiated by the OneDrive sync process. This activity may indicate a user downloading malicious files via a compromised OneDrive account or a malicious payload being synced to the local system.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects explorer.exe spawning the genuine cmd.exe binary with an explicit /c flag to run either the doxc\doxc.bat script from the 'My Resume.iso' lure chain, or config.bat co-occurring with the Documents_Details/windowSysUpdates decoy artifacts from the Document_Detail.zip lure chain — both used by Transparent Tribe (APT-C-56) to launch CrimsonRAT or the Golang RAT.
This rule monitors for the execution or presence of specific file names and SHA256 hashes known to be associated with malicious activity. It queries both process creation and file events to identify these indicators of compromise (IOCs).
Detects the execution or presence of files, processes, or paths associated with the 'SnowKiller' malware or tool, as identified by keyword matching in process event logs.
Detects instances where the GlobalProtect VPN client executable spawns a Windows command shell (cmd.exe). This behavior is highly suspicious as a legitimate VPN client typically does not launch interactive shells, and this pattern has been associated with the execution of malicious payloads such as fake MSI installers.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for specific file hashes, specific suspicious filenames, and suspicious command-line patterns (e.g., 'antivm') initiated by known update or launcher processes. This is likely an indicator of malware behavior involving anti-sandbox or evasion techniques.
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
Detects execution of a specific suspicious executable file masquerading in the Windows Temp directory, coupled with the access of an associated .ini configuration file. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT deployment, often involving initial execution or staging of configuration files within volatile user directories.
Detects the installation or execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, including AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, and Quick Assist. These tools are frequently abused by adversaries for persistence and command-and-control post-compromise.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, initiating suspicious WebDAV network connections, dropping executable or sensitive files, or spawning known LOLBAS processes (rundll32, explorer, regsvr32) from suspicious directories like Temp or WebDAV paths. It also includes a blocklist for known malicious file hashes associated with these patterns.
Detects the execution of OrionQuests-Setup.exe, a .NET-based executable identified as a malicious installer used by the Kimsuky (APT-C-55/BabyShark) threat group. The rule flags PE files that match the specific filename and contain both .NET framework indicators and references to LNK files, suggesting the dropper mechanism for initial stage infection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command line flags (such as hidden windows, bypass execution policies, or encoded commands) where the parent process is a shortcut (.lnk) file. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts via phishing or social engineering, where a user is tricked into clicking a malicious link file.
This rule detects the execution of 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' triggered via a shortcut (.lnk) file. It correlates file creation events involving .lnk files with subsequent process creation events for the specified executable to track potential user execution or masquerading attempts.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation or stealth-related flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, -w hidden) when initiated by CMD or from a LNK file, particularly when originating from Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for malicious file execution and dropper activity.
This rule detects the execution of 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' triggered via a shortcut (.lnk) file. It correlates file creation events involving .lnk files with subsequent process creation events for the specified executable to track potential user execution or masquerading attempts.
Detects execution of the suspicious installer 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' or the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files associated with this specific executable name. This activity is indicative of potential malicious installer behavior, likely used to distribute malware or drop persistent components.
Detects execution of the suspicious installer 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' or the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files associated with this specific executable name. This activity is indicative of potential malicious installer behavior, likely used to distribute malware or drop persistent components.
Detects the execution of 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' followed by the creation of a shortcut (.lnk) file by the same process. This activity is a known indicator of the Kimsuky (APT-C-55) Stella_Gary infection chain, where a disguised installer drops malicious shortcuts to facilitate further execution.
Page 32 of 86