Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the Microsoft Edge browser (msedge.exe) being spawned by common productivity applications like Adobe Acrobat or Microsoft Outlook using the '--single-argument' command-line flag. This pattern is frequently used to force a specific browser window to open a malicious URL, which can be an indicator of a malicious document or phishing email attempting to direct the user to a credential harvesting or malware delivery site.
Detects instances where Adobe Acrobat or Adobe Reader processes initiate suspicious child processes, such as common interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WScript, CScript) or binaries (rundll32, browser executables) often used in malicious document-based attacks to achieve initial code execution.
This rule detects potential spearphishing activity by correlating email attachments containing specific 'Request for Quotation' filenames with subsequent suspicious file creation events on endpoints. It specifically looks for matching attachments (MSG or PDF) from email logs and tracks if similar file patterns appear in Microsoft Outlook content or temporary folders on host devices.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, initiating suspicious WebDAV network connections, dropping executable or sensitive files, or spawning known LOLBAS processes (rundll32, explorer, regsvr32) from suspicious directories like Temp or WebDAV paths. It also includes a blocklist for known malicious file hashes associated with these patterns.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, initiating suspicious WebDAV network connections, dropping executable or sensitive files, or spawning known LOLBAS processes (rundll32, explorer, regsvr32) from suspicious directories like Temp or WebDAV paths. It also includes a blocklist for known malicious file hashes associated with these patterns.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects malicious network connections, file downloads, or process execution associated with the REVSTEALER malware campaign, which utilizes hijacked YouTube channels to distribute fake game-cheat videos that lure users into downloading 'resightloader.exe' from specific malicious domains.
Detects Java-based Metasploit/Meterpreter payload files (.class/.jar) dropped post-exploitation, as observed following PaperCut RCE exploitation chain
Detects scripts or files referencing the JSCeal loading chain that invokes node.exe with -r preflight.js to decompress and execute a compiled V8 bytecode app.jsc payload
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with removable media (USB drives) by identifying two distinct patterns: first, the creation of an 'autorun.inf' file on a removable drive followed by the execution of a script or executable from that same drive shortly after. Second, it identifies executables appearing on removable media that are launched across multiple distinct hosts within a one-hour window, which may indicate worm-like spreading or mass-malware distribution via portable storage.
Detects the delivery of .mobileconfig files or related configuration profile types (e.g., .plist, .xml) via email. These profiles are used on macOS and iOS devices to modify system settings, such as mail, calendar, or contact synchronization, and can be used to install malicious root certificates to enable Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. This rule accounts for direct attachments as well as those concealed within zip archives.
Detects the delivery of .mobileconfig files or related configuration profile types (e.g., .plist, .xml) via email. These profiles are used on macOS and iOS devices to modify system settings, such as mail, calendar, or contact synchronization, and can be used to install malicious root certificates to enable Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. This rule accounts for direct attachments as well as those concealed within zip archives.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
Detects the installation or execution of known remote access tools (RMM) from suspicious parent processes (browsers, archives) or from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of initial access and staging activities performed by ransomware operators or Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The rule excludes known IT-managed deployment paths and signed binaries used by the organization.
Detects the invocation of the AppInstaller executable to install .msix packages, often used in software installation or malicious delivery scenarios involving application deployment.
Detects the execution or presence of files, processes, or paths associated with the 'SnowKiller' malware or tool, as identified by keyword matching in process event logs.
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