Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities on macOS: downloading a file from a potentially malicious source using curl, mounting a disk image using hdiutil, and subsequently opening files from the mounted volume. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery and execution of malicious payloads, such as trojanized software or malware installers.
Detects common productivity applications (e.g., Word, Excel, Acrobat Reader) spawning typical command-line interpreters or scripting hosts. This behavior is a frequent indicator of malicious macro execution or exploit-based payload delivery often seen in phishing campaigns.
This rule detects when users access or download suspicious file types (specifically .xlsm, .docm, or .ics) from Microsoft SharePoint, Teams, or Exchange, where the filenames contain keywords associated with common phishing lures such as credentials, invoices, payroll, or password resets. This monitors for indicators of potential spearphishing attempts involving malicious documents or calendar invites within the M365 environment.
Detects a PDF, SVG, HTML, or presentation attachment containing a QR code or extracted URL that leads into an enterprise authentication workflow. This rule is designed to identify phishing attempts where adversaries embed QR codes or malicious URLs within common document types to direct users to fake enterprise login pages for credential harvesting.
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
Detects scenarios where an executable (.exe) or installer (.msi) is launched from a staging or temporary directory (e.g., Temp, Downloads) and subsequently deleted within 5 minutes. This behavior is indicative of malware or adversary tools cleaning up their own footprints after execution.
Detects web browsers or file explorer spawning common script interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, mshta, etc.) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as encoded commands, Base64 strings, or web-based script downloads, typical of ClickFix or similar browser-based social engineering attacks.
Detects mshta.exe spawning from archive utilities (winrar.exe, 7z.exe) or Windows Explorer, or executing HTA files directly from common user-writable temporary or download directories. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious payloads delivered via compressed archives, a technique observed in campaigns attributed to the Turla threat group.
Detects a multi-stage execution chain involving PowerShell and VBScript, commonly associated with initial access or staging phases of an attack. The rule identifies PowerShell execution with hidden windows, potential malicious downloads from specific domains, script execution via WScript/CScript, and the subsequent execution of dropped files such as 'doc1.exe' from temporary directories.
Detects Microsoft Office applications spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, rundll32.exe) or initiating network connections to WebDAV paths, which may indicate exploitation of ActiveX OLE auto-execution vulnerabilities.
Detects process execution patterns associated with the LegionLoader malware staging area ('Traiolx Custom Utils'). It monitors for unsigned processes launched from this directory or processes spawned by common loaders like msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, or dllhost.exe that exhibit artifacts linked to the malware's anti-debugging and infection routines.
Detects high-risk child processes spawned by 7-Zip (7z.exe, 7zG.exe, 7zFM.exe) when extracting files. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation of CVE-2026-46331, where 7-Zip fails to properly propagate the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream (Mark-of-the-Web) from RAR5 archives, effectively bypassing SmartScreen security warnings for extracted executables or scripts.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns where VS Code (code.exe) spawns interpreter processes (node.exe, python.exe) followed by network connections to known staging infrastructure (e.g., jsonkeeper.com, vercel.app). This behavior is characteristic of the 'Contagious Interview' campaign attributed to the Lazarus Group, used to deploy BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware following social engineering lures.
This rule identifies suspicious activity involving potential trojanized software installers and connections to known typosquatting or malicious domains. It flags processes spawned by common web browsers that match known malicious installer filenames and monitors for DNS queries to domains frequently associated with software supply chain or distribution-based malicious activity.
Detects the execution of ClickOnce applications (via dfsvc.exe, rundll32.exe with dfshim.dll, or by opening .application/.appref-ms files) that are being launched from a remote web or file share source. This behavior is a common technique for proxying malicious code execution.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools from common user-writable or temporary directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData, Public). The rule further filters for processes commonly abused for payload delivery and command execution (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe), or processes containing typical obfuscation and download indicators, excluding benign system process initiators.
Detects the creation of executable files (.exe or .dll) on a removable drive followed by the execution of a process from that same drive within a 30-second window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using removable media to stage and execute malicious payloads.
This rule detects the creation of executable or PowerShell script files in common temporary or user-writeable directories by DllHost.exe within 120 seconds of the execution of wsl.exe. This behavior is indicative of potential payload staging where Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) might be leveraged to obscure or facilitate the delivery and execution of malicious artifacts.
Detects suspicious browser-downloaded executables using image, screenshot, document, invoice, scan, or receipt-themed filenames that execute from user-writable locations and are followed by suspicious payload creation, Run-key persistence, or outbound network activity. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders, fake image/document lures, and user-executed initial access payloads.
Detects instances where the Ghidra software suite (via analyzeHeadless or ghidraRun) or its associated Java runtime initiates unexpected child processes, such as common system utilities (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or executes scripts from untrusted locations like Temp, Downloads, or network shares. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation attempts, such as arbitrary code execution triggered by a malicious project or script import.
Detects the execution of 'ResiLoader.exe' in an environment where it does not load standard .NET runtime dependency modules (e.g., clr.dll, coreclr.dll). This behavior is characteristic of loaders attempting to obfuscate their .NET nature or executing in a manner that bypasses standard managed code monitoring.
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