Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,793 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
906
306
118
108
97
Contributors
444
386
346
85
62
Categories
1,048
468
403
377
369
Platforms
1,572
128
100
89
54
Products / Services
733
484
148
100
76
MITRE Techniques
18,124
15,647
12,595
8,404
6,230
1,793
CVEs
6
5
5
4
3
IDS Classtypes
32
4
2
IDS Protocols
32
4
1
1
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with Java applications or the Lunar Client, specifically targeting the creation of shortcut files (.lnk, .command, .desktop) by Java processes, and the unexpected spawning of shells or interpreters by 'javaw.exe' or Lunar Client processes. These patterns are consistent with modpack-based Remote Code Execution (RCE) attempts or abuse of Electron IPC mechanisms.
This rule detects file creation and process execution events associated with specific SHA256 hashes linked to the APT28 threat actor exploiting CVE-2026-21509.
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
Detects file access (open or read) events targeting documents with file paths matching known UAC-0226 Ukrainian military-themed lures. These documents are often associated with weaponized RAR archives, targeting sensitive military information such as reconnaissance platoon records or military registry data.
This rule detects the execution of script files (.vbs, .ps1, .hta, .lnk, .exe) from potential removable media drives (drive letters D-Z) by common Windows interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe). It monitors for these processes being launched either as standalone processes or as children of other scripts, explorer.exe, or interpreters, while explicitly excluding paths typically associated with legitimate Windows system and program directories.
Detects mshta.exe spawning from archive utilities (winrar.exe, 7z.exe) or Windows Explorer, or executing HTA files directly from common user-writable temporary or download directories. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious payloads delivered via compressed archives, a technique observed in campaigns attributed to the Turla threat group.
Detects the Yuta .NET WPF dropper (SLaunch.exe) writing a PyInstaller-compiled payload (winupdate.exe) to the AppData Roaming .cache directory, followed by the immediate execution of the staged payload from that same location.
Detects the presence of files known to be associated with malicious activity by matching their SHA256 hashes against a list of known bad indicators.
This rule detects post-click execution chains typical of RomulusLoader delivery, specifically identifying when browser or archive applications launch unsigned processes from user-writable directories (e.g., Downloads, Temp), or when a suspicious vulkan-1.dll module is sideloaded from these same directories.
This rule detects scenarios where a common web browser (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, IE, Opera, or Brave) connects to an external destination not on a known allow-list, followed shortly (within 30 seconds) by the execution of a script-based binary (wscript.exe or mshta.exe) on the same host. This is a common pattern for initial access where a user downloads a malicious script from an unknown source via a browser and subsequently executes it.
Detects the execution of known remote access and monitoring software (RMM/RAT) when launched as a child process of common web browsers or email clients. This behavioral pattern is frequently observed in phishing attacks where users are tricked into downloading and executing remote support tools, a technique often associated with the Luna Moth (Silent Ransom Group) campaign.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by decompression utilities or Office applications. This behavior is indicative of a dropper technique where malicious artifacts extracted from archives or spawned by Office documents establish persistence. The rule specifically monitors schtasks.exe command lines that target user-writable directories or involve rundll32-based execution, commonly used by the Obsidian Sandstorm/SilverGorilla threat actor activity.
This rule detects scenarios where a common web browser (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, IE, Opera, or Brave) connects to an external destination not on a known allow-list, followed shortly (within 30 seconds) by the execution of a script-based binary (wscript.exe or mshta.exe) on the same host. This is a common pattern for initial access where a user downloads a malicious script from an unknown source via a browser and subsequently executes it.
Detects the creation of an MSI (Microsoft Installer) file on a device where the file's origin referrer URL indicates it was downloaded from a ZIP archive that was originally an email attachment. This could indicate a user opening a malicious ZIP file from an email, leading to the execution of an installer.
This rule detects multiple stages of activity associated with BaqiyatLock ransomware and Remcos RAT. It identifies the execution of known BaqiyatLock/Remcos files, attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via ms-settings registry hijack, creation of files with the '.bqtlock' extension indicative of BaqiyatLock encryption, and network communication with 'icanhazip.com' for external IP discovery, which is a common reconnaissance step.
This rule detects emails containing macro-enabled documents (.docm, .xlsm, .pptm). It specifically looks for instances where a sender sends two or more such emails within an hour, which could indicate a targeted phishing attempt using malicious macros.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows DllHost.exe process creates or modifies executable or script files in common directories frequently used for staging malicious payloads, such as public folders, temporary directories, and program data. This behavior is often associated with process injection or side-loading techniques where a trusted process is abused to drop secondary malicious files.
Detects the creation of files by WScript.exe or CScript.exe in temporary or program directories followed by the subsequent execution of those files by the same scripting host within a 120-second window. The rule specifically looks for evidence of script-based decoding or processing (e.g., via certutil or hidden windows), which is often associated with the multi-stage execution of payloads.
Detects instances where common Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) launch suspicious child processes often associated with malicious command execution, such as command shells, scripting interpreters, or system utilities.
Detects file creation or modification events occurring within directories containing the string 'SysMain_5874288', which may indicate malicious staging of files, persistence, or tool deployment often associated with potentially obfuscated or specific adversary naming patterns.
This rule detects the creation of files with naming conventions associated with common document-based phishing lures (e.g., invoices, fiscal documents) or DNS requests to specific domains (e.g., pages.dev) frequently leveraged by attackers for hosting malicious content.
Page 51 of 86