Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of 'hdiutil' to attach a disk image with the '-nobrowse' flag, initiated by various scripting interpreters (bash, zsh, python, etc.) or terminal applications. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to silently mount malicious payloads or tools contained within disk images while bypassing user interaction.
Detects the creation or modification of .vscode/tasks.json files that contain configurations designed to execute tasks automatically upon opening a folder in VS Code, specifically utilizing 'runOn': 'folderOpen' combined with visibility-hiding attributes such as 'reveal': 'never' and 'echo': false. This pattern is commonly associated with supply chain attacks where malicious payloads are hidden within project configuration files.
Detects execution of script interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or HTML Application host (mshta.exe) when spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Winword, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) or mshta.exe. This pattern is characteristic of the Gamaredon group's spear-phishing delivery chains (e.g., PteroOdd, PteroDum) that utilize macro-enabled documents or malicious HTA files to execute malicious VBScript.
This rule detects when users access or download suspicious file types (specifically .xlsm, .docm, or .ics) from Microsoft SharePoint, Teams, or Exchange, where the filenames contain keywords associated with common phishing lures such as credentials, invoices, payroll, or password resets. This monitors for indicators of potential spearphishing attempts involving malicious documents or calendar invites within the M365 environment.
Detects anomalous child process execution (PowerShell, mshta, wscript, cscript, or cmd) spawned by common web browsers, which is consistent with the execution chain of CastleLoader malware delivered via EvilTokens PhaaS and ClickFix CAPTCHA lures. These lures typically trick users into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog or directly into the shell.
Detects indicators associated with the deployment and execution of NetSupport RAT, including the launch of 'client32.exe', loading of the 'pcicl32.dll' module, outbound network connections, and the creation of the 'client.ini' configuration file. It also flags execution chains where 'client32.exe' is spawned by common browser or living-off-the-land processes.
Detects anomalous child process execution from common web browsers often associated with Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) attacks. The rule correlates browser-spawned processes like PowerShell, cmd, or mshta with concurrent, suspicious network activity targeting login or account-related domains outside of expected conferencing platforms.
This rule detects when common web browsers or messaging applications spawn suspicious child processes such as command-line interpreters (cmd, powershell, wscript, mshta) or processes associated with remote access tools (NetSupport Manager). Such behaviors are often indicative of exploitation, malicious payload delivery, or unauthorized remote access.
Detects potential CastleLoader delivery by monitoring for suspicious child process executions (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta, wscript, cscript) spawned directly by common browser or email client parent processes. This behavior is indicative of a user interacting with a malicious phishing link or attachment as part of a malware delivery chain.
This rule detects instances where common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe) or mshta.exe spawn shell processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, cmd.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments. These arguments often indicate malicious activity such as downloading and executing code, using encoded commands, or hiding the execution window, which are typical indicators of a web-based delivery or exploitation attempt.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines associated with the TonRAT implant, which is distributed via .lnk shortcut files. The rule identifies obfuscated PowerShell execution spawned by shortcut files, the download of Node.js runtimes from external sources, and the staging of obfuscated JavaScript payloads in temporary directories.
This rule correlates process execution patterns to detect a potential malicious document or file download chain. It monitors for child processes spawned by common document viewers (Adobe Acrobat, Word, Excel, PowerPoint) or browsers (Edge, Chrome, Firefox) that subsequently launch suspicious interpreters (cmd, powershell, wscript) or tools (7z, rar), finally leading to potentially malicious payload execution within common user-writable directories, or obfuscated PowerShell command-line execution.
Detects endpoint file creation or modification events involving PDF files with suspicious, lure-like filenames (e.g., 'Settlement Agreement') being written by email clients or web browsers. This rule acts as a proxy for identifying potential spearphishing attachment execution on the endpoint.
Detects potentially malicious activity associated with the Ghidra reverse engineering framework, including the spawning of unexpected non-Java child processes, loading of suspicious project files (.gzf/.gar), loading of unsigned extensions from non-standard directories, and unexpected outbound network connections from decompiler or Java processes.
Detects a git clone operation performed in a potentially untrusted or sensitive directory (e.g., Desktop, Downloads, Temp) followed immediately by code execution using common interpreters (node, python, powershell). This behavior is consistent with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign, where attackers lure developers into cloning and executing malicious code repositories via social engineering.
This rule detects PowerShell processes initiated where the command line contains references to specific files ('vile_Decryptor.lnk' or 'vile_icon.ico'), which are indicative of suspicious shortcut file execution or associated malware staging activity.
Detects the execution of malicious LNK files (masquerading as image files) that trigger PowerShell scripts, or the subsequent execution of non-Microsoft signed Node.exe binaries from suspicious directories, characteristic of the TonRAT campaign.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) involving commands that access the clipboard, which is a common indicator of the ClickFix social engineering attack technique. In this scenario, users are deceived into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Run dialog.
Detects components of the StrikeShark campaign, specifically the staging of SharkLoader payloads within specific AppData subdirectories (%APPDATA%\xwreg or %APPDATA%\xgdf) and the sideloading of a rogue SystemSettings.dll by the legitimate SystemSettings.exe process from an unauthorized location.
Detects the execution of Node.js from common user-writable directories like Downloads, TEMP, or APPDATA. This behavior is indicative of malicious implants, such as TonRAT or PureRAT, which often masquerade as legitimate tools or are delivered via phishing campaigns like Photo ZIP ClickFix, where a user is tricked into launching a payload from an untrusted location.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities, script interpreters, or installers spawned by web browsers from high-risk directories such as the User Downloads, Temp, or TMP folders. This behavior is indicative of a user downloading and executing malicious files or scripts directly from a web browser.
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