Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of node.exe from common user-writable or non-standard directories such as AppData, Downloads, Temp, ProgramData, or Desktop, accompanied by JavaScript file arguments. This behavior is indicative of the TonRAT campaign which uses a portable Node.js runtime to execute malicious JavaScript payloads in a stealthy manner, bypassing standard installation path detection.
ClickFix style social engineering cluster delivering Mistic and ModeloRAT
Detects suspicious execution of .scr (screensaver) files, execution of 'SecureMessage' named executables (potentially Pony malware), and email attachments containing .scr or .zip files, which are common vectors for malware delivery.
Detects the execution of a PyInstaller-compiled payload associated with the Yuta/Glove Stealer campaign. The rule monitors for processes launching from temporary _MEI* extraction directories within %APPDATA% or %TEMP%, and specifically identifies the winupdate.exe payload within .cache subdirectories.
Detects instances where the LINE messaging application (LINE.exe) initiates child processes commonly associated with malware delivery, such as command-line shells, script interpreters, and archive utilities. This pattern is often indicative of TA4922 activity, which leverages themed lures (HR, payroll, tax) delivered via the platform to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from suspicious or user-writable locations such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData directories. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate development and coding environments, focusing on potential malicious script execution, often associated with droppers or secondary payloads that are not managed by typical IDEs or development tools.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious file types (exe, dll, bat, cmd, vbs, js, ps1) originating from common extraction or user-writable locations like Downloads, Temp, or Roaming AppData directories. The rule specifically flags processes spawned by common archive utilities (winrar.exe, 7zFM.exe, 7zG.exe) or Windows Explorer, with an additional risk assessment if the command line arguments suggest recruitment or financial lure themes.
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Detects the spawning of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) as a child process of common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe). This pattern is often indicative of a drive-by download attack or a user executing a malicious script file downloaded from the internet.
Detects Microsoft Outlook spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) followed by a network connection originating from that interpreter within a 5-minute window. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicative of malicious macro execution or exploit delivery via email attachments leading to command-and-control activity.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a PyInstaller-compiled loader named 'start.exe' spawns 'BQT.exe', which is the identified payload for the BQTLock (BaqiyatLock) ransomware. The rule monitors for process launch events where these specific filenames appear in a parent-child process relationship.
Detects the creation of executable files (.exe or .dll) on a removable drive followed by the execution of a process from that same drive within a 30-second window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using removable media to stage and execute malicious payloads.
Detects instances where the Dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) process writes executable files, scripts, or library files to common temporary or public directories. This behavior is often associated with COM hijacking, lateral movement, or malicious payload staging by adversaries.
Detects execution activity associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED loader, specifically identified by the script interpreter spawning processes or making network requests related to specific decoy URLs (NHIS health portal) or opening decoy PDF files from the user's Downloads directory.
Detects instances where Windows NearShare or QuickShare utilities spawn child processes that are not part of their standard operational or helper suite (e.g., conhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe). This pattern is often indicative of process injection, living-off-the-land techniques, or unauthorized activity masquerading as legitimate Windows sharing services.
Detects instances where Windows NearShare or QuickShare utilities spawn child processes that are not part of their standard operational or helper suite (e.g., conhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe). This pattern is often indicative of process injection, living-off-the-land techniques, or unauthorized activity masquerading as legitimate Windows sharing services.
Detects the execution of script files (e.g., .js, .jse, .vbs) via Windows Script Host (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) where the parent or grandparent process is a known archive extraction utility (e.g., 7zip, WinRAR). The rule further filters by identifying keywords associated with malicious lures (e.g., 'health', 'medical', 'nhis'). This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns delivering malicious attachments.
Detects the execution of a process named 'gemini.exe' with the '--yolo' command-line argument when spawned by common CI/CD runner processes such as 'actions-runner', 'runner.worker', 'node', or 'npm'. This pattern may indicate unauthorized use of execution environments or potential exploitation of a CI/CD pipeline to run suspicious tools.
This rule detects instances where Microsoft Excel (excel.exe) acts as a parent process for suspicious child processes, including command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe), scripting hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe), or binary proxies (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe). This pattern is commonly associated with weaponized office documents executing malicious payloads via macros or other embedded scripts.
Detects PowerShell execution with a command line indicative of a download cradle, initiated from the user's shell (explorer.exe). This behavior is characteristic of the "ClickFix" social engineering technique where a user is tricked into copying and running a malicious command from a webpage.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, Access, Publisher) spawning common command interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used as an initial access vector to execute arbitrary code.
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