Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of potentially malicious processes mimicking cryptocurrency or wallet applications (e.g., 'wallet', 'coin', 'crypto', 'exchange') that are launched from user-accessible directories like Downloads or Temp. The detection specifically looks for these processes spawning command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or proxy execution binaries (rundll32.exe), a behavior pattern characteristic of the AppleJeus campaign associated with Lazarus Group (Diamond Sleet).
Detects Gamaredon (Armageddon) group activity characterized by Microsoft Office applications (winword.exe or excel.exe) writing to global template files (Normal.dotm or Personal.xlsb) to implant malicious macros, or dropping .vbs or .lnk files into startup or template directories to achieve persistence and facilitate further propagation.
This rule detects instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) or Microsoft Excel (excel.exe) initiate a PowerShell (powershell.exe) process containing command-line arguments typical of downloader stagers, such as 'IEX', 'DownloadString', or hidden execution flags. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based delivery of malware, frequently observed in campaigns associated with FIN7/Carbanak and other threat actors utilizing Cobalt Strike or similar offensive frameworks.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
Detects execution patterns associated with known Water Hydra exploit chains, specifically targeting CVE-2023-38831 (WinRAR self-extracting archive exploitation) and CVE-2024-21412 (Mark-of-the-Web/SmartScreen bypass via nested internet shortcuts). The rule monitors process lineage for WinRAR spawning command interpreters from temporary extraction directories and command line anomalies associated with rundll32.exe triggered from internet shortcut chains.
Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
This rule detects network communication with known malicious infrastructure (C2 IPs and URLs), presence of malicious files identified by SHA256 hashes on disk, and execution of known malicious files. It also correlates these activities with specific operator email addresses involved in the malicious campaign.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
Detects a suspected ClickFix-style delivery mechanism where a user visits suspicious domains mimicking legitimate CLI tools (e.g., Gemini, Claude) via web browsers. The detection correlates this initial network access with subsequent suspicious Windows RunMRU activity and the spawning of shell processes (powershell.exe, cmd.exe) from explorer.exe using encoded or download-oriented command line arguments within a 5-minute window.
Detects execution and network activity related to the PamStealer / Wavel malware campaign, including the JXA dropper and associated C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (e.g., JXA dropper, pkgunpack utility) and network connections to identified lure, distribution, and C2 domains and URLs used by the campaign.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule detects executable files (ending in .exe) executing from a specific subdirectory within the user's AppData path (\AppData\Microsoft\Update\). This path is often used by adversaries to masquerade malicious activity or persistence mechanisms as legitimate update processes. The rule excludes common system service accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) to reduce noise, focusing on processes initiated by user-level accounts.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
This rule monitors for network communication with known malicious infrastructure (IPs/domains) and the execution of specific suspicious file names. It correlates device network events, file system activity, and process execution, specifically flagging attempts to execute MSI installers or other binaries associated with the identified threat indicators.
Detects Microsoft Installer (MSI) files associated with the psychedelic stealer malware family. The rule identifies MSI components that contain embedded paths to the psychedeliclove.exe payload, specific command and control IP/port combinations, and decoy file names (e.g., MsMpEng.exe or explorer.exe) used to disguise the malware installation or execution process.
Detects msiexec.exe initiating network connections to or executing packages from endpoints containing 'capher.php' and token parameters. This behavior is associated with the 'ClickFix' delivery chain, where adversaries use malicious websites or scripts to trick users into downloading and executing installer files.
Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
Detects the mounting of VHDX files via disk imaging tools or PowerShell, followed shortly (within 15 minutes) by the execution of a shell process with hidden window flags. This behavioral pattern is associated with the delivery of malicious payloads, such as those observed in Star Blizzard's RedFlick delivery chain for CosmicPulse.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Detects the execution of known Windows 'Living-off-the-Land' binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe) when they originate from web browsers or office productivity applications, or when they are executed with command-line arguments indicative of network resource loading, remote scripting, or code execution bypasses.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
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