Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation or modification of files associated with the Shai-Hulud 2.0 worm. The detection is based on specific file hashes and a behavioral rule for an unusually large 'bun_environment.js' file, which is a key indicator of the malware's obfuscation techniques.
This rule detects the creation or modification of files associated with the Shai-Hulud 2.0 worm. The detection is based on specific file hashes and a behavioral rule for an unusually large 'bun_environment.js' file, which is a key indicator of the malware's obfuscation techniques.
Detects the download of a Java Archive (JAR) file initiated by a document reader, browser, or email client. This behavior is consistent with the Bloody Wolf threat actor, which uses spear-phishing to trick users into downloading malicious JAR loaders for the NetSupport RAT.
Detects the creation of files with double extensions (e.g., .pdf.rar, .txt.exe), a technique used by the Water Gamayun APT group to disguise malicious payloads.
Detects known malicious files associated with the LANDFALL Android spyware by their SHA256 hash. This provides a high-fidelity method for identifying the presence of the spyware on an endpoint.
Detects the execution of shell scripts and creation of files associated with the FlexibleFerret macOS malware campaign, which is tied to fake job recruitment lures to trick users into executing malicious commands.
Detects the creation of files in a directory known to be created by a malicious NSIS installer associated with the RONINGLOADER campaign.
Detects execution of ad-hoc signed applications from suspicious locations, used by FlexibleFerret credential harvesting.
Detects the Tsundere botnet infection chain where msiexec.exe launches a hidden, encoded PowerShell process, which in turn executes a Node.js spawner script.
Detects the creation of malicious disk images (.dmg) or a dropper file (.msi) associated with the DigitStealer macOS infostealer campaign.
Detects network connections from Node.js to specific JSON storage services known to be abused by the 'Contagious Interview' campaign. Threat actors host malicious code on these services, which is then fetched and executed by trojanized applications as part of a social engineering scheme.
Detects phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments designed to harvest credentials and exfiltrate them via the Telegram Bot API. The detection looks for specific attachment filenames (e.g., RFQ, INQUIRY) or content patterns indicative of this threat.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands associated with the ClickFix social engineering tactic. This involves downloading and executing remote payloads, often followed by creating a .lnk file in the Startup folder for persistence.
This query detects execution of processes related to Visual Studio Code extension signing or caching that involve known Glassworm-compromised extensions. Based on indicators published by KOI (October 20, 2025), it identifies suspicious .vsix package operations potentially associated with self-propagating malicious VSCode extensions observed in OpenVSX and Microsoft VSCode marketplaces.
To extract vscode extension version I used this the https://detections.ai/rules/924f7b5f-d8df-4eed-ba06-08c657f65891.
To extract vscode extension version I used this the https://detections.ai/rules/924f7b5f-d8df-4eed-ba06-08c657f65891.
Detects indicators associated with a watering hole attack originating from a compromised xubuntu.org website. This includes the creation of a tampered 'tos.txt' file, the dropping and execution of a trojanized dropper ('elzvcf.exe') in AppData\Roaming, and the establishment of persistence via a registry Run key.
Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
Detects executable downloads from suspicious remote systems
Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
Detects the execution of a malicious LNK file exploiting the ZDI-CAN-25373 vulnerability, a technique used by threat actors like UNC6384. The exploit involves padding the command line arguments with excessive whitespace to hide the malicious command from the user in the file's properties. This rule identifies command or powershell execution containing a large amount of whitespace characters, which is characteristic of this technique.
Detects a process execution where the parent process is explorer.exe and its command line indicates it is launching an LNK file from within a ZIP archive. This is a common TTP for initial access, where users are tricked into opening malicious LNK files embedded in ZIP archives. This version specifically looks for rundll32.exe as the child process, which is a common technique for proxy execution.
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