Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
317 detections
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Detects AMOS malware forking a child process, using setsid to detach from the Terminal session, and then killing the Terminal window via killall Terminal to evade parent-process tracking. This is a key behavioral indicator of the Atomic macOS Stealer delivered via ClickFix campaigns.
Detects the use of the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe) to proxy the execution of mshta.exe, a technique used by ClickFix loaders to execute remote HTA payloads while evading process-based detections.
Detects a specific attack chain involving the movement of 'update.zip' to the temporary directory, its extraction using 'tar -xf', and the subsequent execution of 'update.bat'. This chain is associated with Clickfix attacks.
This rule detects the execution of a specific command-line sequence involving 'cmd.exe' that is characteristic of the ClickFix attack. The sequence includes moving an 'update.zip' file from the user's downloads, extracting a 'u.zip' file in the temporary directory, and then executing 'update.bat'. This pattern is often associated with malicious copy-paste techniques.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell, wscript, or cscript with command-line arguments containing "Invoke-WebRequest" or "curl" in conjunction with specific keywords like "guloader", "etherhiding", or "clickfix". This combination suggests an attempt to download or execute malicious payloads associated with these campaigns or malware families.
This rule detects instances where a web browser (Chrome, MS Edge, Firefox, or Brave) spawns a command prompt (cmd.exe) with a suspicious command line. The command line is characterized by containing a long string (at least 40 characters) within the user's temporary directory (%temp% or \temp\) and multiple command separators (&&, & rem, tar -xf, or rundll32). This pattern is indicative of the 'ClickFix' attack, often involving malicious copy-pasting from a browser into a command prompt.
Detects Windows Script File (.wsf) scripts launching hidden batch (.bat) scripts via cmd.exe. This activity is often part of the ClickFix delivery chain, where wscript.exe (the host for .wsf files) initiates a command prompt to execute a batch file.
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave) spawns `cmd.exe` with a command line that includes a temporary directory path and specific command separators, indicating potential malicious copy-paste activity or drive-by compromise. The rule looks for a long command containing `&&`, `& rem`, `tar -xf`, or `rundll32` within the temporary directory.
Detects instances where 'wt.exe' (Windows Terminal) is used to execute PowerShell or Command Prompt with suspicious command-line arguments often associated with initial execution vectors for ClickFix lures. Specifically looks for hidden window styles, bypass execution policy, or no profile arguments.
Detects ClickFix payloads executing PowerShell with invoke-expression (iex) and invoke-restmethod (irm) to fetch remote payloads into memory without touching disk, as seen in DeepLoad delivery.
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave) spawns `cmd.exe` with a command line that includes a temporary directory path and specific command separators, indicating potential malicious copy-paste activity or drive-by compromise. The rule looks for a long command containing `&&`, `& rem`, `tar -xf`, or `rundll32` within the temporary directory.
This detection captures the initial self-infection mechanism of ClickFix campaigns before secondary payloads are downloaded. It identifies PowerShell execution matching the ClickFix clipboard pattern, specifically launching with hidden window styles and executing base64-encoded strings via Invoke-Expression (IEX).
This rule detects attempts to hijack the clipboard on a web page by identifying HTTP responses (flow:to_client) that contain both 'clipboardData' and 'setData' (case-insensitive) in the file data. This combination of keywords suggests a script attempting to read from and write to the client's clipboard, which is a common technique for clipboard hijacking.
Suspicious Conhost Headless Execution
Cortex XDR
Detects the execution of conhost.exe (or conhost.ext) with the --headless parameter, a technique used in ClickFix campaigns to silently execute clipboard-injected commands.
This rule detects HTTP responses that contain specific keywords indicative of a fake CAPTCHA paste attack page. It looks for the terms "CAPTCHA", "paste", and "Win+R" (case-insensitive) within the HTTP response body. This combination suggests a social engineering attempt where users are tricked into pasting malicious content, often after being instructed to open the 'Run' dialog (Win+R).
Detects the execution of commands indicative of a user pasting a malicious script into the Terminal, often associated with ClickFix or fake CAPTCHA social engineering attacks. This typically involves using tools like `curl` to download and pipe payloads directly to a shell, or the use of `pbpaste` to execute clipboard contents.
Detects the execution of conhost.exe with the --headless parameter. This technique is actively used in ClickFix campaigns to silently execute clipboard-injected commands in the background without user awareness.
Detects rundll32.exe or dllhost.exe performing remote thread injection into web browser processes (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe). This activity is often associated with defense evasion and credential theft staging, as observed in campaigns like ClearFake/ClickFix, before a full Remote Access Trojan (RAT) is established.
Detects the execution of curl on macOS using a hardcoded Catalina user agent (Mac OS X 10_15_7) and silent/fail-fast flags (-fsSL). This pattern correlates with the macOS terminal payload delivery mechanism used in the ClearFake/ClickFix campaign.
Detects the specific sequence of commands used in the ClickFix FakeCaptcha attack, moving a ZIP from Downloads, extracting it via tar, and silently executing a batch file. This rule looks for `cmd.exe` processes that contain `move`, `Downloads`, `tar`, `start`, `-xf`, and `/min` in their command line, along with specific payload filenames like `update.zip`, `u.zip`, or `update.bat`.
Detects rundll32.exe executing with UNC path arguments, indicative of a remote WebDAV payload loaded directly into memory. This behavior has been observed in campaigns such as ClearFake and ClickFix.
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