Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic identifies unauthorized replication RPC calls from non-domain controller devices. It leverages Zeek wire data to detect specific RPC operations like DrsReplicaAdd and DRSGetNCChanges, filtering out legitimate domain controllers. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to introduce a rogue domain controller, which can compromise the integrity of the Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to manipulate directory data, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic detects the temporary addition of a global catalog SPN or a DRS RPC SPN to an Active Directory computer object, indicative of a potential DCShadow attack. This detection leverages EventCode 5136 from the `wineventlog_security` data source, focusing on specific SPN attribute changes. This activity is significant as DCShadow attacks allow attackers with privileged access to register rogue Domain Controllers, enabling unauthorized changes to the AD infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized replication of changes, including credentials and keys, compromising the entire domain's security.
The following analytic identifies a genuine Domain Controller (DC) promotion event by detecting when a computer assigns itself the necessary Service Principal Names (SPNs) to function as a domain controller. It leverages Windows Security Event Code 4742 to monitor existing domain controllers for these changes. This activity is significant as it can help identify rogue DCs added to the network, which could indicate a DCShadow attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to manipulate Active Directory, leading to potential privilege escalation and persistent access within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the creation and quick deletion of a Domain Controller (DC) object within 30 seconds in an Active Directory environment, indicative of a potential DCShadow attack. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5137 and 5141, analyzing the duration between these events. This activity is significant as DCShadow allows attackers with privileged access to register a rogue DC, enabling unauthorized changes to AD objects, including credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized AD modifications, compromising the integrity and security of the entire domain.
Detects the creation or removal of a computer account in Active Directory. This can be indicative of attacks such as DCShadow, which involves registering a rogue Domain Controller to manipulate Active Directory data. The rule specifically looks for Windows Security Event IDs 4741 (A computer account was created) and 4743 (A computer account was deleted).
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