Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a high volume of HTTP requests to Salesforce API endpoints associated with bulk data queries. Specifically, it looks for 20 or more requests within a 60-second window from a single source IP to 'salesforce.com' with URI paths containing both '/services/data/' and '/query/'. This pattern suggests a potential bulk download of customer records or other data via the Salesforce API.
This rule detects potential bulk export of customer data from CRM applications like Salesforce, HubSpot, or Dynamics. It triggers when HTTP requests to these services contain 'export' in the URI, indicating a data export operation. A threshold of 5 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to identify bulk activity.
This rule is meant to help analysts quickly spot a high-confidence indicator related to Google AuraInspector Salesforce Aura Audit. It is written to be easy to understand and to keep false alarms low by focusing on a very specific match: an HTTP POST to a Salesforce /aura endpoint that includes specific Aura method strings. A match does not automatically prove an attacker is currently active, and it does not prove a file was executed, but it does mean the event is important because it lines up with a public threat intelligence source. When this triggers, start by identifying the host, user, and timeframe involved, then decide whether the activity is expected for that system. If it is unexpected, preserve the related logs and any files, and look for nearby events that could explain how the indicator appeared, such as a download, a new process, or a new connection. If the same indicator appears on multiple systems, treat it as a scoping signal and expand the investigation window. Use the reference link (https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat- intelligence/auditing-salesforce-aura-data-exposure) to document where the indicator came from and to support incident notes and reporting.
KQL Query
Detects Salesforce Object Query Language (SOQL) queries that may be attempting to access or exfiltrate sensitive credentials like passwords, API keys, or tokens stored within Salesforce objects. This activity was observed in the UNC6395 campaign where attackers targeted AWS keys, Snowflake tokens, and passwords.
Detects the execution of specific SOQL (Salesforce Object Query Language) queries associated with the UNC6395 data theft campaign. The actor used these queries to enumerate and exfiltrate data from sensitive Salesforce objects.
Detects data theft activity from Salesforce instances by the threat actor UNC6395, who leveraged compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Salesloft Drift third-party application. The detection is based on suspicious user agents and known malicious IP addresses used by the threat actor, specifically targeting the 'Drift' connected application.
