Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

931 detections

The "ScriptRunner.exe" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the
Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`) hosted remotely.
This could be indication of malicious software deployment or lateral movement attempts using Windows Installer functionality.
And the usage of WindowsInstaller COM object rather than msiexec could be an attempt to bypass the detection.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Detects the execution of the PowerShell Pester module's Build.bat script being used as a LOLBAS proxy to execute hidden payloads, as observed in LucidRook/LucidPawn malware campaigns targeting Taiwanese organizations.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
40316
Detects the execution of the "chflags" utility with the "hidden" flag, in order to hide files on MacOS.
When a file or directory has this hidden flag set, it becomes invisible to the default file listing commands and in graphical file browsers.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects the creation of Usage Log files by the CLR (clr.dll). These files are named after the executing process once the assembly is finished executing for the first time in the (user) session context.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects the creation of Self Extraction Directive files (.sed) in a potentially suspicious location.
These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
This rule detects suspicious files created by Microsoft Sync Center (mobsync)
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects the creation of a binary file with the ".sed" extension. The ".sed" extension stand for Self Extraction Directive files.
These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
Usually ".sed" files are simple ini files and not PE binaries.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects cmstp loading "dll" or "ocx" files from suspicious locations
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detect usage of the "coregen.exe" (Microsoft CoreCLR Native Image Generator) binary to sideload arbitrary DLLs.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of the logged-on user's session. Specifically, it targets the BDEUILauncher Class (CLSID ab93b6f1-be76-4185-a488-a9001b105b94)
which can launch BaaUpdate.exe, which is vulnerable to COM Hijacking when started with input parameters. This allows attackers to execute code in the user's context without needing to steal credentials or use additional techniques to compromise the account.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects a network connection initiated by the Add-In deployment cache updating utility "AddInutil.exe".
This could indicate a potential command and control communication as this tool doesn't usually initiate network activity.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) to proxy execute code and making network connections.
One could easily make the DLL spawn a new process and inject to it to proxy the network connection and bypass this rule.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
000
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