Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

931 detections

Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0012
Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0012
Detect indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant pcwrun.exe
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
ZipExec is a Proof-of-Concept (POC) tool to wrap binary-based tools into a password-protected zip file.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Windows Test Authoring and Execution Framework (TAEF) framework allows you to run automation by executing tests files written on different languages (C, C#, Microsoft COM Scripting interfaces
Adversaries may execute malicious code (such as WSC file with VBScript, dll and so on) directly by running te.exe
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Detects file execution using the msdeploy.exe lolbin
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Detects the execution of "Extexport.exe".A utility that is part of the Internet Explorer browser and is used to export and import various settings and data, particularly when switching between Internet Explorer and other web browsers like Firefox. It allows users to transfer bookmarks, browsing history, and other preferences from Internet Explorer to Firefox or vice versa.
It can be abused as a tool to side load any DLL. If a folder is provided in the command line it'll load any DLL with one of the following names "mozcrt19.dll", "mozsqlite3.dll", or "sqlite.dll".
Arbitrary DLLs can also be loaded if a specific number of flags was provided.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Adversaries can abuse wuauclt.exe (Windows Update client) to run code execution by specifying an arbitrary DLL.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects execution of arbitrary DLLs or unsigned code via a ".csproj" files via Dotnet.EXE.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the execution of ".xbap" (Browser Applications) files via PresentationHost.EXE from an uncommon location. These files can be abused to run malicious ".xbap" files any bypass AWL
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations.
This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects Dllhost.EXE initiating a network connection to a non-local IP address.
Aside from Microsoft own IP range that needs to be excluded. Network communication from Dllhost will depend entirely on the hosted DLL.
An initial baseline is recommended before deployment.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects uncommon child process of Setres.EXE.
Setres.EXE is a Windows server only process and tool that can be used to set the screen resolution.
It can potentially be abused in order to launch any arbitrary file with a name containing the word "choice" from the current execution path.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects use of .NET InstallUtil.exe in order to download arbitrary files. The files will be written to "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\"
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects the execution of DeviceCredentialDeployment to hide a process from view
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects code execution via the Windows Update client (wuauclt)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
Detects potential suspicious child processes of "3CXDesktopApp.exe". Which could be related to the 3CXDesktopApp supply chain compromise
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
Detects usage of "ProtocolHandler" to download files. Downloaded files will be located in the cache folder (for example - %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
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