Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects arbitrary command execution using Windows msdt.exe, a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. It identifies instances where msdt.exe is invoked via the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to retrieve a remote payload. This activity indicates an exploitation attempt leveraging msdt.exe to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic detects potential MSC EvilTwin loader exploitation, which manipulates directory paths with spaces to bypass security controls. The technique, described as CVE-2025-26633, involves crafting malicious MSC files that leverage MUIPath parameter manipulation. This detection focuses on suspicious MSC file execution patterns with unconventional command-line parameters, particularly those containing unusual spaces in Windows System32 paths or suspicious additional parameters after the MSC file. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges through DLL side-loading or path traversal techniques.
The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the DllRegisterServer command to load a DLL. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to register a malicious DLL, which can be a method for code execution or persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic detects the execution of `BitLockerToGo.exe`, a legitimate Windows utility. This utility has been observed being abused by the Lumma stealer malware to manipulate registry keys, search for cryptocurrency wallets and credentials, and exfiltrate sensitive data. The malware exploits `BitLockerToGo.exe`'s capabilities for viewing, copying, writing files, and modifying registry branches. This detection is significant for identifying potential Lumma stealer activity, but legitimate use of `BitLockerToGo.exe` in an organization may lead to false positives.
The analytic identifies the use of protocol handlers executed via the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because protocol handlers can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands or launch applications, potentially leading to unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The analytic detects the use of DiskShadow.exe in scripting mode, which can execute arbitrary unsigned code. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions with scripting mode flags. This activity is significant because DiskShadow.exe is typically used for legitimate backup operations, but its misuse can indicate an attempt to execute unauthorized code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system and allowing further malicious activities.
The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.
The analytic detects the execution of Regsvr32.exe with the silent switch (`-s` or `/s`) to load DLLs. This behavior is commonly used in malware campaigns, such as IcedID, to stealthily load malicious DLLs, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code, download additional payloads, and potentially compromise the system. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, specifically focusing on command-line executions.
This analytic identifies the usage of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely utilized executable typically found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution telemetry. The significance of this activity lies in its uncommon usage, which may indicate malicious intent such as code execution or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this process to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further compromise of the system.
This rule detects the execution of binaries that are named similarly to legitimate Sysinternals tools but lack the expected digital signature or product information. Adversaries often rename their malicious tools to impersonate legitimate software like Sysinternals utilities to evade detection and appear less suspicious.
Detects the execution of `cmd.exe` with output redirection (`>`) to suspicious locations such as temporary directories, user profile directories, or `ProgramData`. This technique is often used by adversaries to save the output of reconnaissance commands (e.g., `hostname`, `dir`) to files for later exfiltration, helping them evade immediate detection by storing command output in less scrutinized locations.
Detects the "iexpress.exe" utility creating self-extracting packages. Attackers are known to leverage "iexpress" to compile packages on the fly via ".sed" files. This rule specifically looks for iexpress.exe either launching makecab.exe or iexpress.exe itself being launched with the '/n' command line argument, which is indicative of creating a new self-extracting package.
Detects the creation of Self Extraction Directive (.sed) files in suspicious locations. These files are used by the 'iexpress.exe' utility to create self-extracting packages. Adversaries have been observed abusing this utility to create PE files with embedded .sed entries, often as a defense evasion technique.
Detects the creation of a binary file with the ".sed" extension. The ".sed" extension stand for Self Extraction Directive files.
These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
Usually ".sed" files are simple ini files and not PE binaries.
These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
Usually ".sed" files are simple ini files and not PE binaries.
Detects the execution of known compromised versions of the 3CXDesktopApp by matching specific file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) or by identifying the executable name, original filename, and product name, potentially combined with a specific file version. This rule aims to identify instances of the supply chain attack that affected 3CXDesktopApp.
Detects the execution of 'mpiexec.exe' from the HPC pack with specific command-line flags ('/n 1' or '-n 1'). This combination indicates an attempt to abuse 'mpiexec.exe' as a LOLBIN (Living Off the Land Binary) to proxy the execution of other binaries, potentially bypassing security controls.
Detects the execution of 'dotnet-trace.exe' with command-line arguments indicative of proxy execution, specifically when it's used to collect traces for another process. This technique can be abused by adversaries to bypass defenses by leveraging a trusted Microsoft-signed binary to execute malicious code or actions.
Detects the use of 'IMEWDBLD.exe', a legitimate Microsoft binary, to download arbitrary files from HTTP or HTTPS sources. This technique is often abused by adversaries for ingress tool transfer or to fetch additional malicious payloads, leveraging a trusted binary to bypass defenses.
Detects the usage of 'Squirrel.exe' or 'Update.exe' to download arbitrary files. These binaries are often part of Electron-based software installations (e.g., Slack, Teams, Discord) and can be abused for proxy execution and file download, leveraging their trusted status.
Detects usage of the "ms-appinstaller" protocol handler via command line to potentially download arbitrary files via AppInstaller.EXE. The downloaded files are temporarily stored in ":\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache\<RANDOM-8-CHAR-DIRECTORY>". This technique can be used for defense evasion and execution.
This rule detects potentially suspicious command-line arguments used with Electron-based applications such as Microsoft Teams, Discord, Slack, Microsoft Edge, and VS Code. The presence of specific command-line switches like '--browser-subprocess-path', '--gpu-launcher', '--renderer-cmd-prefix', or '--utility-cmd-prefix' in conjunction with these applications could indicate an attempt to abuse these signed binaries for proxy execution of malicious code, potentially bypassing security controls.
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