Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
434 detections
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Detects processes associated with AI Waifu RAT or common Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) making network connections to localhost. This behavior is indicative of the AI Waifu RAT's C2 and staging mechanisms, which use local ports for command execution and payload delivery.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045) where the service's ImagePath contains suspicious command-line flags ('-c', '-r', '-k') often used with scripting engines, and the ImagePath itself references common scripting or proxy execution binaries such as cscript, mshta, powershell, pwsh, regsvr32, rundll32, or wscript. This combination indicates an attempt to install a service that executes a script or uses a living-off-the-land binary for malicious purposes, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of LOLBins (msiexec.exe, mshta.exe) with command-line arguments to download or execute remote files, a technique used in the ShadowCaptcha campaign's initial access phase via fake CAPTCHA pages.
This rule detects the creation or modification of registry values within common Auto-Start Extensibility Point (ASEP) Run keys. It specifically flags entries that point to suspicious file paths (e.g., C:\Users\Public\, C:\ProgramData\, temporary directories) or contain suspicious command-line interpreters (e.g., rundll32, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters out modifications made by known legitimate processes to reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe spawning a command shell (cmd.exe) to download a remote file. This behavior is indicative of malicious HTA files used to deliver malware, as seen in campaigns distributing Epsilon Red ransomware.
Detects the execution of a shell process (like cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by the Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe). This behavior is often associated with malicious HTA files that use scripting objects like "WScript.Shell" to execute arbitrary commands, as seen in campaigns distributing Epsilon Red ransomware.
Detects the execution of an HTA file (via mshta.exe) that spawns a command prompt to silently download and execute a remote payload using curl. This behavior is consistent with the Epsilon Red ransomware campaign that uses malicious HTA files with embedded JScript to run shell commands.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries to domains impersonating legitimate services, which are known to be used in the Epsilon Red ransomware campaign to deliver malicious HTA files.
Detects suspicious commands written to the RunMRU registry key. This is a characteristic of the "ClickFix" social engineering technique, where a user is tricked into copying a malicious command and executing it via the Windows Run dialog (Win+R). This technique is notably used by Lumma Stealer affiliates.
This hunt looks for PowerShell being executed as a child or grandchild of mshta.exe or network events initiated by PowerShell as a child of mshta.exe.
There are two ways to approach this:
Look for device network events initiated by PowerShell with a parent of mshta.exe
Look for process events where PowerShell is executed with a parent process of mshta.exe
The search in this hunt leverages the second approach.
You could also look for PowerShell command lines making web requests but the obfuscation employed by known threat actors makes this more difficult to find by matching strings.
There are two ways to approach this:
Look for device network events initiated by PowerShell with a parent of mshta.exe
Look for process events where PowerShell is executed with a parent process of mshta.exe
The search in this hunt leverages the second approach.
You could also look for PowerShell command lines making web requests but the obfuscation employed by known threat actors makes this more difficult to find by matching strings.
This is a general rule meant to capture malicious MSHTA abuse pattern agnostic of the attack style or name (i.e., ClickFix, FakeCaptcha, FakeUpdates, ClearFake, etc.)
Detects various initial access TTPs associated with the "ClickFix" attack vector, where users are tricked into running malicious commands. This includes behaviors observed in Lumma Stealer, Latrodectus, and NetSupport RAT campaigns.
In a ClickFix exploit, a command is silently copied to the clipboard when visiting a compromised web page. The user then pastes it into Windows Run believing it's a captcha or a system fix. The executed command is added to the RunMRU registry key which holds details of Windows Run Most Recently Used. This hunt is intended to identify ClickFix exploits by searching the RunMRU registry key value.
Detects mshta.exe executing with command-line arguments containing 'http', which is indicative of mshta.exe being used to download and execute remote HTA files or scripts. This procedure is known to be used in ClickFix attacks where threat actors use fake Captcha portals to download malware payloads.
KQL Query
Detects suspicious use of mshta.exe to execute HTA files followed by certutil.exe for potential data decoding operations related to executable file downloads.
Detects potential misuse of TryCloudflare tunnels for malware delivery or C2 communication by monitoring command-line arguments of common scripting and download tools. Adversaries leverage legitimate services like TryCloudflare to host malicious payloads and evade detection.
Generic rule content from file: LOLBAS - Execution - Outbound Traffic to Suspicious TLD
Detects suspicious command-line strings within the 'TypedPaths' registry key, specifically targeting entries associated with web browsers. This behavior is indicative of the "FileFix" technique, where users are tricked into pasting malicious commands into browser file upload dialogs. The rule looks for common command-line utilities like 'cmd', 'curl', 'powershell', 'bitsadmin', 'certutil', 'mshta', and 'regsvr32' within the 'url1' value of the 'TypedPaths' key, combined with the presence of a '#' character, which often signifies a comment or a separator in such malicious constructs.
KQL Query
Detects execution of mshta.exe from PowerShell, often used for malware delivery via malicious URLs.
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