Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
302 detections
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Detects usage of Msiexec.exe to install packages hosted remotely quietly
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`).
The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.
Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)
Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)
Detects a network connection initiated by an "Msiexec.exe" process over port 80 or 443.
Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages.
Use this rule to hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.
Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages.
Use this rule to hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.
'Identifies malware that has been hidden in the recycle bin.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
Finding attackers hiding malware in the recycle bin.
Read more here: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.
Tags: #execution #SuspiciousPath.
Read more here: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.
Tags: #execution #SuspiciousPath.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, May 2019 0-day disclosures.
In May and June of 2019, a security researcher with the online alias, SandboxEscaper, discovered and published several elevation-of-privilege vulnerabilities on Github. The researcher included proofs-of-concept demonstrating how to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Patches and more information about each vulnerability are available below:
1. CVE-2019-0863 | Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
2. CVE-2019-1069 | Task Scheduler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
3. CVE-2019-1053 | Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
4. CVE-2019-1064 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
5. CVE-2019-0973 | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
6. CVE-2019-1129 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This query locates possible activity that exploits CVE-2019-0973 (also known as InstallerBypass), the fifth vulnerability listed above.
Reference - https://threatpost.com/sandboxescaper-more-exploits-ie-zero-day/145010/
In May and June of 2019, a security researcher with the online alias, SandboxEscaper, discovered and published several elevation-of-privilege vulnerabilities on Github. The researcher included proofs-of-concept demonstrating how to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Patches and more information about each vulnerability are available below:
1. CVE-2019-0863 | Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
2. CVE-2019-1069 | Task Scheduler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
3. CVE-2019-1053 | Windows Shell Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
4. CVE-2019-1064 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
5. CVE-2019-0973 | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
6. CVE-2019-1129 | Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
This query locates possible activity that exploits CVE-2019-0973 (also known as InstallerBypass), the fifth vulnerability listed above.
Reference - https://threatpost.com/sandboxescaper-more-exploits-ie-zero-day/145010/
Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.). This often indicates an attempt to execute malicious code via Office applications, leveraging common living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) or other suspicious executables.
This rule detects the installation of Microsoft Installer (MSI) packages directly from a web source. It specifically looks for MsiInstaller events (EventID 1040 or 1042) in the Windows Application event log where the installation data contains a web protocol indicator (e.g., '://'). This behavior can be indicative of an attacker using msiexec.exe to download and execute malicious MSI files from a remote server, potentially bypassing traditional security controls.
Detects suspicious command execution patterns in the RunMRU registry key often associated with Lumma Stealer ClickFix delivery using specific executables and unusual character sets.
The analytic detects the execution of msiexec.exe with the /y switch parameter, which enables the loading of DLLRegisterServer. This activity can indicate an attempt to register malicious DLLs, potentially leading to code execution or persistence on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the unusual behavior of MSIExec spawning WinDBG. It detects this activity by analyzing endpoint telemetry data, specifically looking for instances where 'msiexec.exe' is the parent process of 'windbg.exe'. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to debug or tamper with system processes, which is uncommon in typical user activity and could signify malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to manipulate or inspect running processes, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.
The analytic detects the use of msiexec.exe with the `/z` switch parameter, which is used to unload DLLRegisterServer. This activity can be indicative of an attempt to deregister a DLL, potentially disrupting legitimate services or hiding malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable security controls, evade detection, or disrupt system functionality, leading to further compromise of the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of the msiexec.exe process with the /HideWindow and rundll32 command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is a known tactic used by malware like QakBot to mask malicious operations under legitimate system processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download additional payloads, execute malicious code, or establish communication with remote servers, thereby evading detection and maintaining persistence.
The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, such as Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process. This activity is significant because MSIExec typically does not spawn child processes other than itself, making this behavior highly suspicious. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects the uninstallation of applications using msiexec.exe with specific command-line arguments. It focuses on process execution logs that include command-line details such as '/qn' (quiet mode), '/X' (uninstall), and 'REBOOT=' (reboot control). This activity is uncommon in enterprise environments and has been associated with malicious behavior, such as disabling security software to facilitate further compromise and persistence.
Detects potential MuddyWater APT activity involving the use of mshta for execution, PowerShell for system information discovery (operating system, network configuration, security center), and a PowerShell-based backdoor with base64 encoding and web requests.
Detects a network connection initiated by an "Msiexec.exe" process over port 80 or 443. Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages. This rule helps hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.
Detects the creation of suspicious child processes by 'scrcons.exe' (Script Event Consumer). 'scrcons.exe' is a legitimate Windows component used for WMI event handling, but its spawning of common scripting interpreters, proxy execution binaries, or task schedulers can indicate malicious activity, often related to persistence or execution techniques leveraging WMI.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe, which is often abused by adversaries for execution and defense evasion. The rule specifically looks for common Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) and scripting interpreters being launched by WmiPrvSE, including certutil, cscript, mshta, msiexec, regsvr32, rundll32, verclsid, wscript, and cmd.exe with specific command-line arguments related to scripting or LOLBINs.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by Microsoft OneNote. This rule identifies attempts to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file by monitoring for OneNote spawning known LOLBINs (Living Off the Land Binaries) or executables from suspicious paths. This behavior is often associated with initial access and execution techniques used by adversaries.
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