Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially suspicious child processes spawned by PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell (powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, pwsh.exe) launching a set of common Windows utilities that can be abused for malicious purposes, such as 'bitsadmin.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'mshta.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'rundll32.exe', 'schtasks.exe', and 'wmic.exe'. The rule includes filters to reduce false positives, such as specific command lines for AWS Workspaces, certutil's '-verifystore' option, and common benign wmic queries.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts obfuscated using techniques associated with Invoke-Obfuscation, specifically when launched via rundll32.exe and shell32.dll. This method is often used by adversaries to evade detection and execute malicious PowerShell code.
This rule detects the execution of 'rundll32.exe' with specific command-line arguments and parent processes that are characteristic of Qakbot malware activity. It looks for 'rundll32.exe' being launched by common scripting or command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, cscript.exe, curl.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, wscript.exe) and attempting to load DLLs from suspicious paths (ProgramData, Users\Public, AppData\Local\Temp, AppData\Roaming). Additionally, it specifically targets known export functions used by Qakbot, such as 'aslr', 'bind', 'DrawThemeIcon', 'GG10', 'GL70', 'jhbvygftr', 'kjhbhkjvydrt', 'LS88', 'Motd', 'N115', 'next', 'Nikn', 'print', 'qqqb', 'qqqq', 'RS32', 'Test', 'Time', 'Updt', 'vips', 'Wind', 'WW50', 'X555', 'XL55', 'xlAutoOpen', and 'XS88'. This combination of indicators aims to reduce false positives by focusing on behaviors uniquely associated with Qakbot.
This rule detects the execution of rundll32.exe when it attempts to call a DLL export by its ordinal number. This technique is often used by malware for defense evasion, as it can bypass security tools that might not monitor rundll32.exe or its specific command-line arguments. The rule specifically looks for command-line patterns like ',#' or '.dll #' which indicate an ordinal call. It includes filters to reduce false positives from legitimate Windows components like EDGEHTML.dll or Visual Studio build processes.
Detects the execution of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) from an unusual or abnormal drive, such as a mounted ISO. This behavior can indicate an attempt by an adversary to evade detection by executing legitimate system tools from non-standard locations, often associated with initial access or defense evasion techniques.
This rule detects the invocation of the 'Archer' malware using 'rundll32.exe'. Specifically, it looks for command-line arguments containing both 'rundll32.exe' and 'InstallArcherSvc'. This pattern indicates an attempt to execute a malicious DLL function named 'InstallArcherSvc' via the legitimate Windows utility 'rundll32.exe', which is a common technique for defense evasion and execution.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution initiated via rundll32.exe, specifically looking for the combination of 'rundll32.exe', 'shell32.dll', 'shellexec_rundll', and 'powershell' within the ServiceFileName field of Windows Security Event ID 4697 (Service Creation). This technique is often used for defense evasion and to execute malicious PowerShell scripts.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution initiated via rundll32.exe. This rule specifically looks for Windows Security Event ID 4697 (A service was installed in the system) where the ServiceFileName contains specific keywords indicative of rundll32.exe being used to execute obfuscated commands, potentially involving PowerShell.
This rule detects the execution of `rundll32.exe` with the `InstallScreenSaver` command-line argument. This technique can be abused by attackers to execute arbitrary applications as a screensaver file (.scr) for defense evasion, as `rundll32.exe` is a legitimate Windows utility. The rule specifically looks for `rundll32.exe` (or its original filename) and the `InstallScreenSaver` string in the command line.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32.exe', 'shell32.dll', 'shellexec_rundll', and 'powershell'. This specific combination is indicative of an attempt to execute obfuscated PowerShell code via rundll32.exe, a common technique for defense evasion and execution.
Detects adversaries leveraging the MiniDump export function from comsvcs.dll via rundll32 to perform a memory dump from lsass. This technique is often used to extract credentials.
This rule detects suspicious execution of 'rundll32.exe' when it attempts to load 'advpack.dll' and specifically calls functions using an obfuscated ordinal number (e.g., '#12' or '#-'). This technique is often used by adversaries to leverage the 'RegisterOCX' function for defense evasion, as it can bypass security monitoring that might not scrutinize rundll32.exe's normal operations or direct DLL function calls.
This rule detects instances where 'rundll32.exe' is executed without any command-line parameters. This behavior has been observed in the context of Metasploit's windows/smb/psexec exploit module, where rundll32.exe is used to proxy execution of malicious code. Legitimate uses of rundll32.exe typically involve specific DLL and function arguments.
Detects the creation of a new service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32' and 'shell32.dll' along with obfuscation indicators like '&&', 'value', 'invoke', 'comspec', or 'iex'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to execute obfuscated PowerShell commands via rundll32, specifically leveraging 'shellexec_rundll'.
Detects when 'rundll32.exe' attempts to load a DLL from a remote network path (e.g., a UNC path starting with '\\'). This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, as legitimate rundll32.exe usage typically involves loading local DLLs.
Detects suspicious network connections initiated by specific Windows binaries (regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, dllhost.exe) when they are executed without any command-line parameters. This behavior can indicate an attempt to evade detection by leveraging legitimate system binaries for malicious network communication, potentially associated with malware like Raspberry Robin.
Detects the creation of suspicious child processes by hh.exe (Microsoft HTML Help). Adversaries often abuse hh.exe to proxy execution of other malicious binaries or scripts, leveraging it as a LOLBIN (Living Off The Land Binary) to bypass defenses. The rule specifically looks for hh.exe launching common system utilities that can be used for malicious purposes, such as CertReq.exe, CertUtil.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe, installutil.exe, MSbuild.exe, MSHTA.EXE, msiexec.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, schtasks.exe, wmic.exe, and wscript.exe.
Detects suspicious process patterns indicative of CrackMapExec (CME) being used to dump LSASS credentials. The rule looks for specific command-line arguments used by CME for LSASS dumping, including combinations of 'tasklist' with 'Imagename eq lsass.exe', 'rundll32.exe' with 'comsvcs.dll' and temporary paths, and 'tasklist' with 'findstr /i "lsass"'. These patterns are commonly observed when attackers attempt to extract credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory.
Detects suspicious execution of "PDQDeployRunner" which is part of the PDQDeploy service stack that is responsible for executing commands and packages on remote machines. The rule specifically looks for PDQDeployRunner spawning suspicious child processes, executing commands with suspicious arguments, or executing from suspicious paths, which could indicate abuse for malicious purposes.
This rule detects the execution of 'rundll32.exe' with specific command-line arguments ('keymgr' and 'KRShowKeyMgr') which indicates an attempt to invoke the Stored User Names and Passwords dialogue, also known as the Key Manager. This activity can be used by adversaries to access or backup stored credentials.
Detects `rundll32.exe` loading a renamed `comsvcs.dll` to dump process memory, which is a common technique for credential dumping, specifically targeting LSASS. The rule looks for `rundll32.exe` executions where the loaded image is NOT the legitimate `comsvcs.dll` (implying a renamed or malicious version).
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