Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
Detects the VS Code CLI (code-insiders / code) being used to install a remote tunnel as a service, run from outside normal application install locations (e.g. the Windows debug folder). Keyed on the tunnel service install behavior and unusual location rather than a specific file path, so renamed or relocated copies still match. Abuse enables covert remote access via Microsoft tunnel infrastructure. Rotation test: still fires if the actor changes the directory, flags order or infrastructure, as long as the binary is run with tunnel + service install outside standard paths.
The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is added to common persistence locations on a device within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
The following analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications
that are covered by Cisco Secure Firewall Application Detectors, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Event.
This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate
data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
that are covered by Cisco Secure Firewall Application Detectors, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Event.
This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate
data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
The following analytic detects DNS queries to domains associated with known remote access software such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This detection is crucial as adversaries often use these tools to maintain access and control over compromised environments. Identifying such behavior is vital for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because unauthorized remote access can lead to data breaches, ransomware attacks, and other severe impacts if these threats are not mitigated promptly.
Detects the execution of known remote administration and monitoring tools (such as Atera, Syncro, Splashtop, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, etc.) originating from user-writable or temporary directories (such as AppData, ProgramData, Users, Downloads, Windows Temp) and spawned by common application or system processes (such as browsers or explorer).
This rule detects the execution of common remote access and management (RMM) tools from non-standard directories such as user profiles, temp folders, or other locations outside of standard application installation paths (e.g., Program Files or ProgramData). Such activity is often indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or the use of portable RMM binaries by an adversary to maintain persistent access.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
Detects the execution of a ScreenConnect installer executable followed by the deployment or startup of its associated client components (WindowsClient.exe or ClientService.exe) within a 30-minute window on the same device. This rule is designed to identify the unauthorized installation or deployment of remote access software.
Detects the execution of a ScreenConnect installer executable followed by the deployment or startup of its associated client components (WindowsClient.exe or ClientService.exe) within a 30-minute window on the same device. This rule is designed to identify the unauthorized installation or deployment of remote access software.
This rule detects the execution of common remote access and management (RMM) tools from non-standard directories such as user profiles, temp folders, or other locations outside of standard application installation paths (e.g., Program Files or ProgramData). Such activity is often indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or the use of portable RMM binaries by an adversary to maintain persistent access.
Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
Detects the execution of a ScreenConnect installer executable followed by the deployment or startup of its associated client components (WindowsClient.exe or ClientService.exe) within a 30-minute window on the same device. This rule is designed to identify the unauthorized installation or deployment of remote access software.
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