Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic monitors Windows RDP client connection sequence events (EventCode 1024) from the Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational log. These events track when RDP ClientActiveX initiates connection attempts to remote servers. The connection sequence is a critical phase of RDP where the client and server exchange settings and establish common parameters for the session. Monitoring these events can help identify unusual RDP connection patterns, potential lateral movement attempts, unauthorized remote access activity, and RDP connection chains that may indicate compromised systems.
Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8. Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors. Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.
The following analytic detects the execution of the remote desktop process (mstsc.exe) on systems where it is not typically run. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, filtering out systems categorized as common RDP sources. This activity is significant because unauthorized use of mstsc.exe can indicate lateral movement or unauthorized remote access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain remote control of a system, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or further network compromise.
The analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
This analytic detects DNS queries to domains associated with known remote access software such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This detection is crucial as adversaries often use these tools to maintain access and control over compromised environments. Identifying such behavior is vital for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because unauthorized remote access can lead to data breaches, ransomware attacks, and other severe impacts if these threats are not mitigated promptly.
This analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer, as identified by Cisco Secure Firewall Application Detectors. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Events. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
This analytic detects when a known remote access software is added to common persistence locations on a device within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. The detection specifically looks for modifications to the 'Run' registry keys or 'ImagePath' values within service registry keys, which are common methods for establishing persistence. The rule leverages a lookup table containing known remote access tools such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
This analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.
This rule detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool processes or network connections to domains associated with RMM tools. It leverages an external CSV file containing a list of RMM tool executable names and their associated domains to identify suspicious activity. The rule aims to identify the presence and use of legitimate RMM software, which can be abused by adversaries for remote access and control.
The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages network logs mapped to the Web data model, identifying specific URLs and user agents associated with remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these utilities to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or further compromise the network, posing a severe security risk.
This detection identifies when a Microsoft Teams message containing a URL associated with a known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool was sent and subsequently clicked by the intended recipient or the original sender. The domain is not part of the organization's approved RMM solutions, indicating a potential use of Living-off-the-Land RMM (LOLRMM) techniques often employed in initial access or persistence stages by threat actors.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
Detects potentially rogue or self-hosted ConnectWise Control (ScreenConnect) session launches based on suspicious query string patterns in the command line. Specifically flags sessions that include parameters like `e=...&y=...&h=...&p=...` but where the `h=` (host) value does not include common trusted TLDs. May indicate use of unauthorized remote access tools.
Investigative Tip: Sandboxing or running the strings command against the binary will reveal the embedded host parameter if you really want to be sure.
Investigative Tip: Sandboxing or running the strings command against the binary will reveal the embedded host parameter if you really want to be sure.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious USB device connections based on manufacturer, product, and device ID indicators.
Primary focus is on known identifiers associated with IP-KVM devices. The search utilizes the CrowdStrike event feed, specifically focuses on the following event types:
- DcUsbDeviceConnected
- DcUsbDeviceDisconnected
- DcUsbDeviceBlocked
The device identifiers are sourced from publicly available sources (primarily GitHub).
Primary focus is on known identifiers associated with IP-KVM devices. The search utilizes the CrowdStrike event feed, specifically focuses on the following event types:
- DcUsbDeviceConnected
- DcUsbDeviceDisconnected
- DcUsbDeviceBlocked
The device identifiers are sourced from publicly available sources (primarily GitHub).
KQL Query from file: Sentinel All-In-One IP ThreatHunt
KQL Query from file: Detecting Blind Eagle APT-C-36
KQL Query
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: MDE: Detecting Quick Assist Usage
KQL Query from file: RMM Hunting with Sentinel TI
KQL Query from file: Muddled Libra
This rule detects the execution of SimpleHelp remote access software. SimpleHelp is a legitimate desktop support and remote access tool that adversaries may abuse to establish command and control (C2) channels. The rule specifically looks for process creation events where the image path contains "JWrapper-Remote Access" or "JWrapper-Remote Support" and the executable name is "SimpleService.exe". This pattern indicates the execution of the SimpleHelp service component.
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