Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects the deployment and activity of the MeshCentral remote management agent (meshagent), including process execution, service creation, and network communication to MeshCentral infrastructure. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized persistence and remote command-and-control, often associated with post-compromise activity such as that observed by ShinyHunters.
Detects the installation or first execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, specifically AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect, shortly after an identity change or MFA reset event, indicative of social engineering vishing-to-remote-access techniques often employed by threat actors such as Scattered Spider (UNC3944).
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
Detects the execution of known browser credential harvesting tools (WebBrowserPassView, WebBrowserBookmarksView, or WS_Password variants) from ScreenConnect temporary directories. This behavior often indicates post-compromise activity where an adversary uses an existing Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) session to extract credentials from browsers.
Detects potential vishing activity associated with the Sauron Loader threat. The rule identifies a pattern of a mailbox receiving a high volume of inbound emails (spam or subscription bombs) within a short window, followed by the user launching remote assistance tools like Quick Assist or AnyDesk on the same endpoint, indicating an attacker-guided remote session.
Detects potential callback phishing (Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery) by correlating phishing-themed emails containing phone numbers with no hyperlinks to the subsequent execution or installation of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software on the same host within a six-hour window. The rule further refines this by ensuring the RMM tool was not previously installed on the user's system.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the execution of known remote access and support tools (Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance, or AnyDesk) on a host that has recently received a high volume of emails (over 50). This behavior often aligns with social engineering campaigns where a user is instructed to download or launch a remote support tool under false pretenses.
Detects the installation of a potential remote monitoring and management (RMM) agent via common tools like msiexec, nssm, or sc.exe, followed by consistent HTTPS beaconing to domains hosted on Azurewebsites.net. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote access tools used for command and control.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software installers or command-line arguments when invoked by PowerShell processes. This behavior is often indicative of malicious post-compromise activity where an adversary uses legitimate remote access tools to establish persistent command-and-control access.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
This rule detects the execution of common remote access and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) tools spawned directly from web browser processes (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox). It further monitors for subsequent suspicious child process activity such as command shell execution or file operations performed by these RMM tools, which is a common pattern in post-exploitation and initial access activities.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware agent, including C2 tasking, Go agent 'frpc' tunnel configuration retrieval, tunnel deployment status reporting, and internal loopback C2 server communication.
Detects specific HTTP traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware's FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) reverse-tunneling deployment and C2 status reporting. The rule identifies the sequence of fetching configuration, initiating WebSocket tunnel links, and reporting deployment status to a remote command-and-control server.
Detects the execution or presence of AnyDesk.exe within directories containing 'UBP-Asset' that are outside of known, legitimate installation paths. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to use remote access software for persistent access or command and control, commonly disguised within unconventional directories.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects a sequence of events where a single user receives an unusually high volume of inbound emails (potentially vishing-related), followed shortly thereafter by the user executing common remote assistance or remote access tools (e.g., Quick Assist, AnyDesk). This pattern is consistent with social engineering tactics used in IT-support impersonation scams to facilitate the delivery of malware such as Sauron Loader.
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