Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) software on Windows systems. This behavior is frequently abused by threat actors, including Scattered Spider, to maintain persistent access after gaining control via social engineering or identity-based attacks (e.g., vishing-driven credential or MFA resets).
Detects the launch or execution of common remote access tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) on an endpoint, excluding instances where these tools act as the parent process. This rule serves as one component of a broader detection chain for potentially unauthorized remote access.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events suggesting potential technical support scam or social engineering activity: a rapid influx of emails (email bombing) followed by an external Microsoft Teams call, and subsequently the execution of a common remote access tool on the same host within a short timeframe.
Detects the execution of the AnyDesk remote support application when initiated from a web browser (msedge.exe) or the Windows file explorer (explorer.exe). This pattern is often indicative of user-driven execution, potentially as part of a tech support scam or unauthorized remote access attempt.
Detects a sequence of events where a user is targeted by an email bombing attack, subsequently receives an external or anonymous Microsoft Teams call, and finally launches a known remote access tool (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host within a one-hour window. This pattern is consistent with social engineering campaigns designed to trick users into providing remote access to their systems.
Detects the execution of AnyDesk or its installation from common user-writable directories (Downloads or AppData), as well as scenarios where a browser (msedge.exe) initiates an AnyDesk-related download. This is a common indicator of unauthorized remote access tool deployment.
Detects the deployment of NetSupport Manager (client32.exe) or related components when initiated by common scripting interpreters such as PowerShell, MSHTA, or CMD. This behavior is indicative of a ClickFix-style social engineering attack where a user is coerced into executing malicious commands to deploy remote access tools.
Detects the silent installation or execution of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools when launched by script hosts (wscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe) which themselves were spawned by browser processes or explorer.exe. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering delivery chains, such as 'ClickFix', where a user is tricked into executing a script that subsequently fetches and runs RMM payloads for persistent remote access.
Detects the execution of NetSupport Remote Access Tool (RAT) components (client32.exe, Nskbfltr.sys, or TCCTL32.dll) from locations outside of the standard program installation directories. This behavior is often indicative of unauthorized persistence or masquerading by malware utilizing remote support software for C2.
Detects a multi-stage Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery (TOAD) campaign. The first stage identifies phishing emails containing billing or security-themed subjects and phone numbers without links or attachments to evade automated analysis. The second stage monitors for the subsequent installation or execution of common remote-support tools (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect). A final correlative rule detects these events occurring sequentially on the same host, indicating a high-confidence indicator of a successful callback phishing social-engineering attempt.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
Detects the execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software on a host shortly after the associated user account underwent a password or MFA reset, a pattern indicative of help-desk impersonation (vishing) followed by unauthorized remote access setup.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software on a host shortly after the associated user account underwent a password or MFA reset, a pattern indicative of help-desk impersonation (vishing) followed by unauthorized remote access setup.
Detects the execution of known remote access or remote monitoring software (such as TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or ScreenConnect) on corporate-issued Windows endpoints. The rule triggers on process execution patterns associated with unauthorized remote control, specifically looking for indicators of unattended access or silent installation commonly used by overseas actors to remotely operate company-issued laptops assigned to fraudulently hired identities.
Detects the execution of known remote access or remote monitoring software (such as TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or ScreenConnect) on corporate-issued Windows endpoints. The rule triggers on process execution patterns associated with unauthorized remote control, specifically looking for indicators of unattended access or silent installation commonly used by overseas actors to remotely operate company-issued laptops assigned to fraudulently hired identities.
Detects network activity associated with NetSupport Manager remote access software, specifically targeting DNS lookups, TLS SNI connections, and direct TCP beaconing to a known-malicious infrastructure IP. This rule is designed to identify unauthorized use of legitimate remote support tools for command and control purposes.
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