Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
141 detections
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Monitor and alert for changes to the device registration policy.
Detects various sensitive configuration modifications in AWS that could indicate malicious activity, such as privilege escalation, defense evasion, or data exposure. This rule looks for a curated list of API calls related to changes in IAM, EC2 security groups, S3 bucket policies, and logging configurations.
Detects various sensitive configuration modifications in AWS that could indicate malicious activity, such as privilege escalation, defense evasion, or data exposure. This rule looks for a curated list of API calls related to changes in IAM, EC2 security groups, S3 bucket policies, and logging configurations.
Detects events in Okta where there is the eventType of ~'policy.lifecycle' and the policy of 'OktaSignOn'.
This will capture when new signon policies are created or updated. This could allow users to authenticate to Okta where the current policy does not apply. (i.e: enforcing MFA)
This will capture when new signon policies are created or updated. This could allow users to authenticate to Okta where the current policy does not apply. (i.e: enforcing MFA)
Detects various sensitive configuration modifications in AWS that could indicate malicious activity, such as privilege escalation, defense evasion, or data exposure. This rule looks for a curated list of API calls related to changes in IAM, EC2 security groups, S3 bucket policies, and logging configurations.
This detection looks for administrative activity that creates or updates Cross-Tenant Access Settings or Cross-Tenant Identity Synchronization Settings in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD). These settings control how identities, claims, and trust relationships are shared between Microsoft Entra tenants.
Detect when a user creates a new Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) in Active Directory for their own AD object. This can be an indicator of an adversary attempting to maintain persistence or escalate privileges by modifying permissions on their own account to grant themselves additional rights or to prevent other users from modifying their account.
Detects potential abuse of Microsoft Actor tokens for cross-tenant impersonation attacks targeting Entra ID tenants. This rule identifies suspicious audit log entries that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-55241, a critical vulnerability in Azure AD Graph API that allowed attackers to impersonate any user across Entra ID tenants using malicious Actor tokens.
KQL Query from file: Monitoring Cross-Tenant Abuse by Threat Actors
KQL Query from file: Entra Cross-Tenant Activity Monitoring
KQL Query
The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) using Splunk's Admon data. It identifies events where a new GPO is created, excluding default "New Group Policy Object" entries. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, significantly compromising the network's security.
This analytic detects modifications to the default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in an Active Directory environment. It leverages Splunk's Admon to monitor updates to the "Default Domain Policy" and "Default Domain Controllers Policy." This activity is significant because changes to these default GPOs can indicate an adversary with privileged access attempting to gain further control, establish persistence, or deploy malware across multiple hosts. If confirmed malicious, such modifications could lead to widespread policy enforcement changes, unauthorized access, and potential compromise of the entire domain environment.
"This query searches for any action type with high frequency that involves adding, modifying, or removing something in cloud app policies. It sees where the properties are modified such that the old value and new value are different for every property except for minor property changes such as Display Name."
'This query detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task usually used to deploy ransomware at scale.
It monitors whether a scheduled task is modified within the Sysvol folder in GPO.
Ref: https://bogusecurity.com/2019/12/26/persistence-and-execution-at-scale-via-gpo-scheduled-task/'
It monitors whether a scheduled task is modified within the Sysvol folder in GPO.
Ref: https://bogusecurity.com/2019/12/26/persistence-and-execution-at-scale-via-gpo-scheduled-task/'
This query helps in reviewing top policies for user overrides (Allow/Block)
This query helps identifying when new items being added to the Tenant/Allow Block List (TABL) in Defender for Office 365.
This query helps hunting for Tenant allow/block list (TABL) changes in Defender for Office 365
This detection identifies when a new Microsoft Intune device management configuration policy has been created. Intune device management configuration policies are used by administrators to remotely manage policies and settings on Intune-managed devices. This functionality can be abused by adversaries to disable defenses and evade detection.
The following analytic detects the addition of permissions required for a DCSync attack, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log to identify when these permissions are granted. This activity is significant because it indicates potential preparation for a DCSync attack, which can be used to replicate AD objects and exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to Active Directory, leading to severe data breaches and privilege escalation.
The following analytic identifies when cross-tenant access/synchronization policies are changed in an Azure tenant. Adversaries have been observed altering victim cross-tenant policies as a method of lateral movement or maintaining persistent access to compromised environments. These policies should be considered sensitive and monitored for changes and/or loose configuration.
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