Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
102 detections
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This rule detects when a user (excluding service accounts) explicitly sets IAM permissions on a Google Cloud Storage bucket, potentially indicating unauthorized privilege escalation or modification of access controls to facilitate data exfiltration or persistence.
This rule monitors Okta system logs for lifecycle events related to inbound Identity Providers (IdP), specifically creation, modification, activation, deactivation, or deletion. It flags these changes when initiated by clients identified as proxies or associated with known abused ASNs. This activity is indicative of potential cross-tenant impersonation where an attacker with administrative access adds a malicious IdP to federate and impersonate organizational users.
Detects modifications to domain trust relationships, such as the creation of a new trust, removal of an existing trust, or changes to trusted domain information. Such events are monitored as they can indicate an adversary attempting to elevate privileges or establish persistence across a forest or multi-domain environment.
Detects any modification (add, update, or delete) to Entra ID cross-tenant access settings. Adversaries may manipulate these trust configurations to weaken inbound security restrictions, establish unauthorized access between tenants, or facilitate cross-tenant impersonation.
Detects modification of domain trust relationships via LDAP for privilege escalation
Detects events in Okta where there is the eventType of "user.session.impersonation.grant".
This grants access in the context of the user. This could be high privilege admin access.
This grants access in the context of the user. This could be high privilege admin access.
Detects any modification (add, update, or delete) to Entra ID cross-tenant access settings. Adversaries may manipulate these trust configurations to weaken inbound security restrictions, establish unauthorized access between tenants, or facilitate cross-tenant impersonation.
Detects modifications to domain trust relationships, such as the creation of a new trust, removal of an existing trust, or changes to trusted domain information. Such events are monitored as they can indicate an adversary attempting to elevate privileges or establish persistence across a forest or multi-domain environment.
This rule detects attempts to modify domain trust relationships via LDAP write operations. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 389 (LDAP) to the home network, containing the case-insensitive strings "trustType" and "trustDirection". This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to establish or alter trust relationships between domains for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This rule detects potential Kerberos authentication abuse related to cross-domain trusts. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 88 (Kerberos) to the home network, containing the byte '6b' at the first position of the payload. A threshold of 20 occurrences within 10 seconds from the same source IP is set to trigger an alert, indicating a potential brute-force or rapid authentication attempt.
This rule detects the creation of a new domain trust via LDAP by looking for specific content in TCP traffic on port 389 (LDAP). It specifically targets HTTP POST requests containing "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" in the payload, indicating an attempt to establish a new trust relationship between domains.
Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain.
This rule detects suspicious user-agent strings in Microsoft Graph activity logs that are commonly associated with reconnaissance and attack tools targeting Azure AD and Microsoft 365 environments. These tools include BloodHound, ROADtools, AADInternals, and various other utilities used for enumeration, credential spraying, and other malicious activities.
This detects events in Okta where there is the eventType of "user.session.impersonation.grant".
This grants access in the context of the user. This could be high privilege admin access.
This grants access in the context of the user. This could be high privilege admin access.
Detects events in Okta where there is the eventType of "user.session.impersonation.grant".
This grants access in the context of the user. This could be high privilege admin access.
This grants access in the context of the user. This could be high privilege admin access.
Detects AWS IAM roles whose trust policies were newly created or updated to allow cross account AWS principals to assume the role without any confused deputy protections in place.
This detection looks for administrative activity that creates or updates Cross-Tenant Access Settings or Cross-Tenant Identity Synchronization Settings in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD). These settings control how identities, claims, and trust relationships are shared between Microsoft Entra tenants.
Detects when a new identity provider is created in Okta. This activity can be a legitimate administrative action but could also indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication mechanisms by creating a rogue identity provider.
This analytic detects the addition of a new federated domain within an Azure Active Directory tenant. It identifies successful "Set domain authentication" operations in Azure AD AuditLogs. This activity is significant as it may indicate the use of the Azure AD identity federation backdoor technique, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure AD environment.
Detects scenarios where an federated trust is added by an attacker.
Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain within Microsoft 365 audit logs. This activity can be a legitimate administrative action but also indicates potential federated credential abuse or the establishment of a backdoor via federated identities.
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