Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for two high-confidence indicators of malicious activity: the execution of known Payouts King ransomware binaries and the termination of security software processes by non-system actors, which is indicative of defensive evasion techniques such as syscall abuse.
This rule identifies potentially malicious activity where a process, which has been dormant on the system for at least 7 days since its initial start, suddenly performs a high volume (more than 50 events in 60 seconds) of file creation or modification events. This behavior pattern is often indicative of ransomware encryption activities, where malware lies dormant before initiating a rapid, destructive encryption cycle.
This rule detects suspicious file renaming activities indicative of ransomware. It specifically looks for files that previously had common document extensions (.doc, .xls, .ppt) being renamed to extensions commonly associated with encryption by ransomware (.encrypted, .locked, .crypted, .ecc). The rule triggers if 20 or more such renames occur within a 5-minute window on a single device.
This rule detects attempts by a device to resolve specific domain names known to be associated with ransomware killswitches. Successful resolution of these domains could indicate a ransomware infection attempting to halt its encryption process.
This rule detects high-frequency file renaming or creation activities within a short timeframe (60 seconds) that involve uncommon file extensions. This behavior is highly characteristic of the encryption phase of ransomware attacks, where malicious processes quickly rename or encrypt files across the system.
This rule detects high-frequency file renaming or creation activities within a short timeframe (60 seconds) that involve uncommon file extensions. This behavior is highly characteristic of the encryption phase of ransomware attacks, where malicious processes quickly rename or encrypt files across the system.
This rule detects potential Akira ransomware activity by correlating three distinct malicious phases on a network: first, the deletion of volume shadow copies using vssadmin, wmic, or powershell; second, the disabling of system recovery features via bcdedit or wbadmin; and third, high-volume file renaming (indicating encryption) across multiple endpoints. The rule aggregates these events to identify coordinated campaign activity across at least two hosts.
Detects high volumes of file operations (creation, rename, or modification) where files are given extensions typically associated with ransomware (e.g., .locked, .encrypted). The rule aggregates activity by process and endpoint and triggers an alert when the number of such operations exceeds a defined threshold, while excluding known legitimate backup and security software.
Detects the creation of a new .vhdx virtual disk file by hypervisor management processes. This behavior is used by threat actors, specifically Akira ransomware, to instantiate new virtual machines that lack organizational security tooling to evade endpoint detection before proceeding with malicious activities.
Detects the deletion of immutability policies on Azure blob containers. Immutability policies protect critical data from being tampered with; their deletion is a necessary step for attackers aiming to encrypt or destroy backups and storage data prior to a ransomware event.
Detects the creation of an encryption scope within an Azure Storage account. Attackers may use this to encrypt victim blobs with their own keys, as observed with threat actors like STORM-0501, to demand ransom.
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts associated with the VILE ransomware. The VILE ransomware Go-based binary is known for employing ETW tracing suppression and direct NT system calls to bypass EDR user-mode hooking. Identifying these unique filenames on the host acts as a high-fidelity indicator that the VILE binary is actively present and executing.
This rule monitors Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) to detect high-volume file creation activity across multiple unique directories. By filtering out common file types, it identifies potential signs of mass file modification, staging for exfiltration, or malicious encryption characteristic of ransomware or data destructive operations.
Detects Payouts King ransomware activity by identifying file rename events to the .ZWIAAW extension or the creation of the 'readme_locker.txt' ransom note on any disk path. The rule specifically accounts for file operations that might utilize techniques like SetFileInformationByHandle for evasion.
Detects potential execution of a Tox ransomware negotiation channel by monitoring for processes that exhibit a high rate of file writes (potential encryption activity) in conjunction with command-line arguments containing specific patterns such as a 76-character string or the 'tox://' URI scheme, which are associated with Tox ransomware client activity.
Detects high-frequency S3 PutObject requests that utilize Customer-Provided Encryption Keys (SSE-C). A high count of such operations within a short window can be indicative of ransomware activity, where an adversary encrypts data within the victim's cloud storage using their own keys to prevent access by the owner.
This rule identifies potentially malicious activity where a process, which has been dormant on the system for at least 7 days since its initial start, suddenly performs a high volume (more than 50 events in 60 seconds) of file creation or modification events. This behavior pattern is often indicative of ransomware encryption activities, where malware lies dormant before initiating a rapid, destructive encryption cycle.
This rule detects multiple stages of activity associated with BaqiyatLock ransomware and Remcos RAT. It identifies the execution of known BaqiyatLock/Remcos files, attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via ms-settings registry hijack, creation of files with the '.bqtlock' extension indicative of BaqiyatLock encryption, and network communication with 'icanhazip.com' for external IP discovery, which is a common reconnaissance step.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume of file creation or renaming events where the new file names end with common ransomware extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.crypted'. It aggregates these events over 5-minute intervals and triggers if 50 or more such files are observed on a single device.
This rule detects suspicious file activity indicative of ransomware by monitoring for a high volume of file creations or renames where the filenames contain common ransomware-related extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.ransom'. It aggregates these events over a one-hour period per device and triggers if 20 or more such events occur.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities like vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe, combined with concurrent file activity in multiple directories, a behavior frequently observed during the impact phase of a ransomware attack (specifically associated with the Qilin ransomware family).
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