Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with the Qilin ransomware, beginning with suspicious VPN authentication (potential credential stuffing or bypass), moving through lateral movement attempts (SMB/RDP/WMI), and culminating in ransomware behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, mass file encryption, and ransom note creation.
This rule detects ransomware activity by identifying two primary indicators: a high volume of file renames to common ransomware extensions within a 5-minute window, and the creation of known ransom notes across multiple directories. It excludes processes signed by trusted vendors to minimize noise.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity within the user's Desktop directory. This pattern is often associated with ransomware activity, automated data exfiltration tools staging files, or malicious droppers unpacking payloads.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for two key signals: interaction with known canary/trap files designed to detect unauthorized access, and rapid, mass file modification of common user data extensions within a short timeframe. Either behavior is indicative of encryption or automated file destruction processes typical of ransomware attacks.
This rule detects the creation or modification of at least 10 files within an hour that have the '.prinzeugen' extension, which is indicative of the Prinz Eugen ransomware encrypting files using ChaCha20.
Detects indicators of Akira ransomware activity, specifically the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin, the creation of known Akira ransom notes (akira_readme.txt, restore_files.txt), and the generation of files with the .akira extension.
Detects Akira ransomware-related activity by identifying the creation of characteristic ransom notes or files with the .akira extension, combined with signs of security defense impairment (such as disabling Windows Defender via command line).
Detects potential ransomware activity characterized by a high volume of file modifications (create, write, rename) involving common document/data extensions, combined with the execution of commands designed to inhibit system recovery (shadow copy deletion, BCD modifications) or perform network share enumeration within the same timeframe and on the same host.
This rule detects activities associated with the VILE ransomware, specifically the creation of file staging artifacts (vile_user_files.zip), execution of associated binaries, and network communication with Gofile.io infrastructure used for exfiltration.
Detects processes running at High or System integrity levels that correlate with the creation of specific file artifacts known to be associated with VILE ransomware. The rule monitors for potential privilege escalation or token manipulation indicative of the ransomware's attempt to gain necessary permissions for encryption operations.
Detects the execution of notepad.exe where the command line arguments reference a file path located in 'C:\temp\' and include a filename typical of ransomware notes, such as 'HowToRestoreFiles.txt'. This behavior is characteristic of ransomware displaying instructions to the victim after file encryption.
Detects high-volume file modification or renaming operations targeted at specific file extensions (dcm, tf, parquet) commonly associated with sensitive data (DICOM imaging, Terraform states, database parquet files) or operations occurring within Docker volume directories. The detection uses an aggregation logic to identify when a process performs more than 20 such file operations on an endpoint, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration, encryption, or tampering.
This rule detects a high frequency of file rename or modification events targeting files with extensions commonly associated with ransomware. It filters out activity from processes signed by trusted vendors like Microsoft, Symantec, Sophos, and Trend Micro to reduce noise, flagging mass rename operations that could indicate an active ransomware encryption process.
This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
This rule identifies potential ransomware activity by detecting a process performing a high volume of file rename or modification operations within a short time window. It specifically targets files with known ransomware extensions or those using randomized 6-8 character alphanumeric extensions, while excluding common administrative, backup, and temporary file operations performed by trusted software.
This rule correlates multiple low-to-medium confidence signals across file, process, network, and registry events to detect potential ransomware activity. The rule identifies suspicious behaviors including mass file renames, creation of known ransom note file types in multiple directories, shadow copy deletion via system utilities, disabling of antivirus and security monitoring, large archive staging, unauthorized outbound network connections, and suspicious process injection. Alerts are generated based on the aggregation and frequency of these signals, indicating a high probability of ransomware-related malicious activity.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with the Qilin ransomware, beginning with suspicious VPN authentication (potential credential stuffing or bypass), moving through lateral movement attempts (SMB/RDP/WMI), and culminating in ransomware behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, mass file encryption, and ransom note creation.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that bypass execution policies to specifically disable or suspend BitLocker protection. This behavior is often associated with ransomware or malicious actors attempting to circumvent full-disk encryption to facilitate data manipulation or destruction.
Ransomware group exploiting edge devices and managed file transfer software
Detects high-volume file modifications or renames performed by a single process over a short window, affecting many unique file paths. This behavioral pattern is highly indicative of ransomware activity attempting to encrypt data for impact.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for QEMU virtualization software spawning child processes followed by mass file encryption (using extensions .threeamtime or .bqtlock) and the creation of typical ransomware note files (e.g., RECOVER.txt, README.txt).
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