Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential data staging and exfiltration behavior characterized by large volumes of outbound network data combined with high frequency file write operations across multiple file types. It monitors Sysmon Event IDs 3 (Network connection) and 11 (FileCreate) to identify indicators often associated with pre-encryption staging by ransomware or data theft campaigns.
This rule detects potential data staging and exfiltration behavior characterized by large volumes of outbound network data combined with high frequency file write operations across multiple file types. It monitors Sysmon Event IDs 3 (Network connection) and 11 (FileCreate) to identify indicators often associated with pre-encryption staging by ransomware or data theft campaigns.
Detects BQTLock ransomware activity by monitoring for mass file encryption events (file extensions .bqtlock or .baqiyatlock) and the creation of associated ransom note files (README.bqtlock or HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt) using Sysmon and Windows Security Event logs.
Detects LCRYX ransomware activity orchestrated by VBScript using wscript.exe or cscript.exe. The rule monitors for the mass encryption of files identified by the .lcryx extension and the creation of PLEASEREADME.txt ransom notes, typical behaviors of this ransomware variant.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
Detects anomalous SMB traffic indicating potential ransomware activity. The rule monitors for file operations associated with known ransomware naming conventions (e.g., README.txt, DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS) or common ransomware-related extensions. It uses a threshold to identify high-frequency occurrences within a short timeframe, suggesting bulk file renaming or ransom note creation typical of encryption phases.
Detects anomalous SMB traffic indicating potential ransomware activity. The rule monitors for file operations associated with known ransomware naming conventions (e.g., README.txt, DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS) or common ransomware-related extensions. It uses a threshold to identify high-frequency occurrences within a short timeframe, suggesting bulk file renaming or ransom note creation typical of encryption phases.
This rule detects ransomware activity by identifying two primary indicators: a high volume of file renames to common ransomware extensions within a 5-minute window, and the creation of known ransom notes across multiple directories. It excludes processes signed by trusted vendors to minimize noise.
This rule detects an unusual number of successful encryption-related operations performed by a single caller within a one-hour window in Azure Activity logs. This could indicate legitimate bulk administrative tasks or potentially malicious activity such as data encryption for impact (e.g., ransomware) or preparation for exfiltration by an attacker.
Detects indicators of Akira ransomware activity, including execution of the binary, dropping of ransom notes, renaming of files with .akira extension, and the use of vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') when their command line arguments contain references to common cloud storage services (OneDrive, SharePoint, GoogleDrive, Dropbox, iCloud). This pattern could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data to cloud storage or encrypt data for impact, potentially as part of a ransomware attack.
Detects the execution of cmd.exe triggered by specific potentially malicious filenames or involving known ransomware-related artifacts, such as 'boottel.dat', ransomware note files, or specific suspicious file extensions like '.SZO'. This is indicative of ransomware deployment or post-compromise cleanup and extortion activities.
Detects the execution of cmd.exe triggered by specific potentially malicious filenames or involving known ransomware-related artifacts, such as 'boottel.dat', ransomware note files, or specific suspicious file extensions like '.SZO'. This is indicative of ransomware deployment or post-compromise cleanup and extortion activities.
Detects the execution of known ransomware-related executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') when their command line arguments indicate interaction with cloud storage services such as OneDrive, SharePoint, GoogleDrive, Dropbox, or iCloud. This behavior is indicative of ransomware attempting to encrypt or exfiltrate data from cloud environments.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Uses time-series aggregation to detect massive bursts of file renaming events across user directories, where files are appended with the .nightspire extension.
This rule detects a high frequency of file rename or modification events targeting files with extensions commonly associated with ransomware. It filters out activity from processes signed by trusted vendors like Microsoft, Symantec, Sophos, and Trend Micro to reduce noise, flagging mass rename operations that could indicate an active ransomware encryption process.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for two key signals: interaction with known canary/trap files designed to detect unauthorized access, and rapid, mass file modification of common user data extensions within a short timeframe. Either behavior is indicative of encryption or automated file destruction processes typical of ransomware attacks.
This rule detects the use of password derivation functions (like argon2id, scrypt, pbkdf2) in command lines, which can be indicative of ransomware activity, specifically associated with Prinz Eugen. It focuses on processes like 'servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe', and 'powershell.exe' initiating these commands.
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