Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of ransomware activity, specifically the Prinz Eugen ransomware. It looks for the execution of common file compression utilities (7z.exe, rar.exe, WinRAR.exe, winzip.exe) followed by the execution of known ransomware encryption executables (servertool.exe, encrypt.exe) on the same device within a 30-minute window. This pattern suggests that an attacker is compressing files before encrypting them, a common tactic to reduce the size of data for faster encryption or exfiltration.
Detects GreenBlood ransomware activity targeting network shares and USB drives. This rule identifies file rename or creation events with specific ransomware extensions (.tgbg, .bak) or ransom note filenames ('READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt'), combined with the use of extended path prefixes (\?\ or \?\UNC\) often employed by ransomware for network/UNC path targeting. The rule aggregates these events and alerts if three or more such files are detected from a single process on a device.
Detects the execution of notepad.exe to open a file named 'HowToRestoreFiles.txt' from a temporary directory, which is a common indicator of a ransomware note being displayed to the victim.
Detects the modification of the Windows Registry 'LegalNoticeText' key, which is used to display a message to the user upon logon. This specific rule flags the inclusion of known ransomware-related URLs or domains in the text, commonly used as a ransom note mechanism by adversaries.
This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of virtualization management tools (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd, PowerShell cmdlets for vSphere/Hyper-V) to perform disruptive actions such as powering off VMs, removing snapshots, or modifying firewall configurations. The rule excludes activity originating from standard management processes and trusted VMware/Microsoft signed processes.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of virtualization management tools (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd, PowerShell cmdlets for vSphere/Hyper-V) to perform disruptive actions such as powering off VMs, removing snapshots, or modifying firewall configurations. The rule excludes activity originating from standard management processes and trusted VMware/Microsoft signed processes.
This rule detects a pattern of network shared folder access followed by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') within a 45-minute window. This behavior is indicative of ransomware preparing to encrypt data on network shares.
This rule correlates multiple low-to-medium confidence signals across file, process, network, and registry events to detect potential ransomware activity. The rule identifies suspicious behaviors including mass file renames, creation of known ransom note file types in multiple directories, shadow copy deletion via system utilities, disabling of antivirus and security monitoring, large archive staging, unauthorized outbound network connections, and suspicious process injection. Alerts are generated based on the aggregation and frequency of these signals, indicating a high probability of ransomware-related malicious activity.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying a combination of three distinct behaviors occurring on a single endpoint within a short window: high-volume file modifications (indicative of file encryption), deletion of system recovery resources (e.g., volume shadow copies, backup catalogs), and high-frequency network activity (indicative of data exfiltration). The rule uses cross-event correlation to reduce false positives by requiring all three signals to be present.
High-velocity ransomware-as-a-service with aggressive leak-site extortion
This rule monitors for the creation or modification of files containing the string 'readme_locker' in their filename. This pattern is commonly associated with ransomware strains that leave behind ransom notes, often as part of the data encryption impact phase.
Detects activity associated with the Payouts King ransomware, including identified malicious binary hashes, the creation of Mozilla-themed scheduled tasks for persistence, and execution via command line to elevate tasks to SYSTEM privilege.
This rule detects a process identified as a Go-compiled binary (via command-line arguments like 'goroutine' or 'runtime.main') that exhibits rapid, high-volume file interactions (more than 100 files accessed or created in a 60-second window) alongside outbound network connectivity. This behavior is indicative of malicious automated activity such as file encryption for ransomware or rapid data staging and exfiltration.
Detects potential execution of a Tox ransomware negotiation channel by monitoring for processes that exhibit a high rate of file writes (potential encryption activity) in conjunction with command-line arguments containing specific patterns such as a 76-character string or the 'tox://' URI scheme, which are associated with Tox ransomware client activity.
This rule detects a process identified as a Go-compiled binary (via command-line arguments like 'goroutine' or 'runtime.main') that exhibits rapid, high-volume file interactions (more than 100 files accessed or created in a 60-second window) alongside outbound network connectivity. This behavior is indicative of malicious automated activity such as file encryption for ransomware or rapid data staging and exfiltration.
This rule detects a process performing a high volume of file write operations to UNC paths within a short timeframe. It further filters for processes that lack metadata such as company information, description, or digital signatures, and do not load common system DLLs, which is often indicative of potentially malicious or unpacked code attempting to encrypt or exfiltrate data across a network.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities like vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe, combined with concurrent file activity in multiple directories, a behavior frequently observed during the impact phase of a ransomware attack (specifically associated with the Qilin ransomware family).
This rule detects a process performing a high volume of file write operations to UNC paths within a short timeframe. It further filters for processes that lack metadata such as company information, description, or digital signatures, and do not load common system DLLs, which is often indicative of potentially malicious or unpacked code attempting to encrypt or exfiltrate data across a network.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities like vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe, combined with concurrent file activity in multiple directories, a behavior frequently observed during the impact phase of a ransomware attack (specifically associated with the Qilin ransomware family).
This rule detects high-frequency file renaming or creation activities within a short timeframe (60 seconds) that involve uncommon file extensions. This behavior is highly characteristic of the encryption phase of ransomware attacks, where malicious processes quickly rename or encrypt files across the system.
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