Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects an unusual number of successful encryption-related operations performed by a single caller within a one-hour window in Azure Activity logs. This could indicate legitimate bulk administrative tasks or potentially malicious activity such as data encryption for impact (e.g., ransomware) or preparation for exfiltration by an attacker.
This rule flags a large number of files receiving a '.lalia' extension at once, indicating potential Lalia ransomware activity. Bulk extension changes are a common initial indicator of ransomware infection. The rule looks for at least 20 file events (renamed, created, or modified) where the file name ends with '.lalia' within a 30-day window.
This rule watches for creation of ransom notes associated with the Lalia family. Notes often appear in multiple folders once encryption finishes. Identify patient zero and check offline backups. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
This rule detects attempts by a device to resolve specific domain names known to be associated with ransomware killswitches. Successful resolution of these domains could indicate a ransomware infection attempting to halt its encryption process.
Detects the creation or renaming of files to append the .nspire extension, a direct indicator of NightSpire ransomware encryption activity.
This rule detects the creation of files with names commonly associated with ransomware notes (e.g., 'ransom_note', 'decrypt_files', 'pay_ransom') and common text file extensions (.txt, .html, .htm). It summarizes these events by device and time, flagging devices where at least one such file is observed.
Detects the creation of files with names commonly associated with LockBit ransomware, such as '.lockbit', 'lockbit_note', or '.abcd'. This rule specifically looks for these file names being created on devices, which is indicative of ransomware activity.
This rule detects attempts by a device to resolve specific domain names known to be associated with ransomware killswitches. Successful resolution of these domains could indicate a ransomware infection attempting to halt its encryption process.
This rule detects suspicious file activity indicative of ransomware by monitoring for a high volume of file creations or renames where the filenames contain common ransomware-related extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.ransom'. It aggregates these events over a one-hour period per device and triggers if 20 or more such events occur.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume of file creation or renaming events where the new file names end with common ransomware extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.crypted'. It aggregates these events over 5-minute intervals and triggers if 50 or more such files are observed on a single device.
This rule detects the creation of a specific mutex pattern associated with the Grixba ransomware. The mutex name starts with 'CPFATE_' and contains the .NET framework version string 'v4.0.30319', which is a unique artifact used by Grixba to ensure only one instance of itself is running.
This rule detects suspicious activity indicative of post-quantum ransomware, combining two main indicators: the execution of processes with command-line arguments related to post-quantum cryptographic algorithms (Kyber, ML-KEM, NTRU, Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS) and the creation of common ransomware notes (README.txt, DECRYPT.txt, RESTORE.txt, PAYMENT.txt, RANSOM.txt). The cryptographic operation detection specifically looks for high or system integrity processes and excludes common legitimate cryptographic tools. The rule correlates multiple cryptographic operations within a short timeframe and the creation of ransom notes to identify potential ransomware deployment.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
This rule detects a high volume of network share connections (SMB/CIFS) from a single device to multiple remote IPs within a short timeframe. This behavior can be indicative of ransomware attempting to encrypt files across network shares, or other forms of rapid lateral movement and data access. The rule specifically looks for connections on ports 445 or 139 initiated by common user or system processes like explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe.
This rule detects suspicious file renaming activities indicative of ransomware. It specifically looks for files that previously had common document extensions (.doc, .xls, .ppt) being renamed to extensions commonly associated with encryption by ransomware (.encrypted, .locked, .crypted, .ecc). The rule triggers if 20 or more such renames occur within a 5-minute window on a single device.
This rule detects a pattern indicative of ransomware encrypting files over SMB. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) within the home network, containing the byte sequence '|FF|SMB'. A threshold of 500 such events from a single source IP within 30 seconds triggers the alert, classifying it as trojan activity.
Detects the specific command line arguments used by Payouts King ransomware, specifically requiring the mandatory execution trigger parameter '-i' alongside at least one of the obfuscated behavior flags: '-noelevate', '-nohide', '-nopersist', or '-note'. This combination is highly indicative of Payouts King ransomware execution.
Detects the creation of specific Payouts King ransomware artifacts, including its ransom note ('readme_locker.txt') and known encrypted file extensions ('.ZWIAAW') or temporary backup file extensions ('.esVnyj'). This rule focuses on file creation events indicative of a Payouts King ransomware infection.
This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying a high volume of file encryption events. It looks for files being renamed or created with common ransomware-related extensions such as '.locked', '.crypt', '.encrypted', '.enc', or a generic pattern of a 6 or more character alphanumeric extension. The rule then counts these events within one-hour bins and alerts if more than 20 such files are detected in a single folder path.
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