Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,050 detections
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Yara rule that detects Albabat ransomware.
This Yara rule detects the presence of Cactus ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption, file discovery, process checking, and process killing functionalities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes within executable files, indicating the presence of Cactus ransomware components.
Yara rule that detects Cactus ransomware.
This YARA rule detects various components and behaviors associated with the BlackBasta ransomware. It identifies specific byte patterns related to file discovery, encryption routines (multiple versions), command prompt execution, LDAP connection attempts, dropping of ransom notes, and exclusion logic for files/volumes from encryption. The rule is designed to catch the ransomware executable itself based on these unique code signatures.
Yara rule that detects BlackBasta ransomware.
Yara rule that detects BlackBasta ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the Lorenz ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption routines, file discovery mechanisms, scheduled task creation for persistence, and remote connection functionalities. The rule includes two main versions of the ransomware's code, covering different implementations of these malicious activities.
This YARA rule detects the Meow ransomware based on specific byte patterns found in its executable code. The rule looks for patterns associated with file encryption routines, the dropping of a ransom note, and functions used to find files on the system. The condition requires the presence of the MZ header (indicating a Windows executable) and all defined string patterns to match, ensuring a high-fidelity detection of the Meow ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Lorenz ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Meow ransomware.
This rule detects the Moisha ransomware by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to file enumeration, private key importation, and file encryption routines. The rule looks for distinct sequences of MSIL (Microsoft Intermediate Language) instructions that are characteristic of Moisha's operational methodology.
This rule detects GwisinLocker ransomware activity on Linux systems. It identifies specific byte patterns associated with the ransomware's key initialization, file encryption routines, file discovery mechanisms, process termination, and ESXi shutdown capabilities. The rule has two main versions (v1 and v2) of these functionalities, and a match occurs if all parts of either version are found.
Yara rule that detects Moisha ransomware.
Yara rule that detects GwisinLocker ransomware.
Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
This YARA rule detects the RedAlert ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns within the executable. The patterns correspond to functions involved in setting up the environment, finding files to encrypt, encrypting files, and making configuration changes, which are characteristic behaviors of the RedAlert ransomware.
Yara rule that detects RedAlert ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the Acepy ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities: finding files to encrypt, performing the encryption process, and dropping a ransom note. The rule requires all three patterns to be present within a Windows executable file (indicated by the MZ header) to trigger a detection.
This rule detects the BlueLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its file encryption and file finding routines, as well as its cryptographic context creation. The rule looks for three distinct parts of the encryption process ($encrypt_files_p1, $encrypt_files_p2, $encrypt_files_p3), two parts of the file finding process ($find_files_p1, $find_files_p2), and a pattern for creating the cryptographic context ($create_crypt_context). All these patterns must be present for a detection to occur, indicating the presence of the BlueLocker ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Acepy ransomware.
Yara rule that detects BlueLocker ransomware.
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