Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This YARA rule detects the Rokku ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption, file finding, and folder finding functionalities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes (opcodes and operands) that are characteristic of the Rokku ransomware's code for these operations. The condition requires the presence of the standard Windows executable MZ header (0x5A4D) and all defined byte patterns for finding folders, finding files, and encrypting files.
This YARA rule detects the Ryuk ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its file encryption routines, file discovery mechanisms, and remote connection capabilities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes ($encrypt_files_p*, $find_files_p*, $remote_connection) that are characteristic of Ryuk's malicious operations. The rule requires all parts of the encryption and file finding patterns, as well as the remote connection pattern, to be present for a match.
This rule detects the Sage ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities: establishing remote connections, encrypting files, and finding files to encrypt. The rule requires all three patterns to be present within a file to trigger, reducing false positives.
This YARA rule detects the Satan ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include establishing remote connections, searching for processes, encrypting files, and searching for files in specific folders. The rule combines these patterns to increase confidence in detection.
This YARA rule detects the Satana ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption routines, file searching mechanisms, and remote connection capabilities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes ($encrypt_files_p1, $encrypt_files_p2) indicative of how the ransomware encrypts files, patterns related to how it searches for files ($search_files_p1, $search_files_p2), and byte sequences involved in establishing remote connections ($remote_connection). The rule requires the presence of the remote connection patterns, along with all file searching and file encryption patterns, to trigger a detection, ensuring a high confidence in identifying Satana ransomware.
This rule detects the Serpent ransomware based on specific byte patterns found in its executable code. The patterns indicate functionalities related to DLL manipulation and thread creation, file enumeration and searching, and establishing remote connections, including FTP. The rule specifically targets the Serpent ransomware family.
This rule detects the SevenSevenSeven ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within the executable. It looks for distinct code sequences related to file searching, encryption routines, and remote server communication, which are characteristic of this particular ransomware family. The rule requires the presence of all file search patterns and a combination of either the first set of encryption and remote server patterns or the second set.
This Yara rule detects the Spora ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its core functionalities. These functionalities include routines for encrypting files, creating key files, generating encryption keys, and enumerating resources on the system. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns to ensure high confidence in detection.
This YARA rule detects the TBLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns within the executable. It looks for distinct sequences of bytes associated with the ransomware's main functions, including those responsible for searching and encrypting files. The rule requires all parts of the main ransomware function patterns, along with the file search and encryption patterns, to be present in a PE (Portable Executable) file (indicated by `uint16(0) == 0x5A4D`) to trigger a detection.
This YARA rule detects the TeleCrypt ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its file encryption routines, server communication mechanisms, payload execution, and payload copying functions. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns to ensure high confidence in detection. Specifically, it checks for patterns associated with generating strings for encryption, the encryption process itself, communication with a command and control server, executing the ransomware payload, and copying the payload.
This YARA rule detects the VHDLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns (strings) associated with its file encryption routines, logical drive enumeration, and file finding mechanisms. The rule requires all three sets of patterns to be present in a file to trigger, indicating a high confidence detection for the VHDLocker malware.
This YARA rule detects the Velso ransomware by identifying specific byte sequences (patterns) associated with its file enumeration, resource enumeration, and file encryption routines. The rule looks for distinct code blocks within the malware that are characteristic of how Velso operates to find files, enumerate system resources, and encrypt data.
This YARA rule detects the Zeppelin ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include searching for files to encrypt, enumerating network shares, killing processes that might interfere with encryption, and performing the file encryption itself. The rule requires the presence of all these distinct code sections to trigger, reducing false positives.
This rule detects the Ako ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns (YARA signatures) associated with its file encryption routines, including those targeting local files and network shares. The rule looks for distinct code sequences related to file enumeration and encryption activities, indicating the presence and execution of the Ako ransomware.
Yara rule that detects KillDisk ransomware.
Yara rule that detects LuckyJoe ransomware.
Yara rule that detects 5ss5c ransomware.
Yara rule that detects ASN1Encoder ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Afrodita ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Ako ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Archiveus ransomware.
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