Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic (TLS SNI or HTTP Host) to Firebase domains (firebaseio.com, firebaseapp.com, firebasedatabase.app) associated with Mantax Otax and other Android ransomware families for ransom negotiation chat channels.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct indicators: deletion of Volume Shadow Copies (using native Windows utilities), mass file modifications (>100 files in 15 minutes), and the creation or modification of files typically associated with ransom notes. The rule uses an inner join to ensure these events happen within a 30-minute window of each other on the same device.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects the presence of OpnKey ransomware-specific configuration strings related to size-tiered file encryption settings in process command lines. These indicators suggest the execution of a binary with hardcoded logic to categorize files for encryption based on their size.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects DragonForce ransomware note (readme.txt) referencing known DragonForce Tor negotiation/blog onion addresses
Detects DragonForce ransomware note (readme.txt) referencing known DragonForce Tor negotiation/blog onion addresses
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects file system operations targeting common user directories and specific file extensions (.bak, .backup, .locked) often associated with data exfiltration, staging, or ransomware activity.
Detects a high volume of file rename events initiated by a single process on a device within a short time window (5 minutes). This behavior is often indicative of ransomware activity, where files are renamed as part of the encryption or extortion process.
Detects the LockScreen component blocking user input and displaying a full-screen StopAndProtect ransom note referencing Telegram/BTC payment.
Detects high-volume file deletion or modification activity within sanctioned cloud storage applications, monitored via Netskope. This behavior is indicative of potential ransomware, malicious bulk data destruction, or an insider threat attempting to sabotage data.
Detects SilentEncryptor ransomware by correlating Encryptor.exe execution with a mass file-rename burst and creation of encrypted_files_V/encryption_log_V artefacts.
Detects potential DeadLock ransomware activity by correlating a high volume of file renames (using the .dlock extension) within a short window, alongside the creation of known ransomware notes (HOW_RECOVER*.txt or RECOVERY_CHAT*.html) or the modification of the desktop wallpaper registry key to point to a file in C:\ProgramData.
Detects high-volume file deletion or modification activity within sanctioned cloud storage applications, monitored via Netskope. This behavior is indicative of potential ransomware, malicious bulk data destruction, or an insider threat attempting to sabotage data.
Detects potential DeadLock ransomware activity by correlating a high volume of file renames (using the .dlock extension) within a short window, alongside the creation of known ransomware notes (HOW_RECOVER*.txt or RECOVERY_CHAT*.html) or the modification of the desktop wallpaper registry key to point to a file in C:\ProgramData.
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