Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for two indicators of potential ransomware activity: first, a surge in file renaming or creation events across multiple directories within a short window, suggesting large-scale encryption; second, the creation of potential ransom note files across multiple directories or devices. It uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint data to identify these patterns as part of an incident response strategy.
Detects high-volume file modification events resulting in files renamed with the .inc extension, which is a characteristic behavior of the INC ransomware strain. The rule monitors for more than 50 such modifications on a single host within a 10-minute window, serving as an indicator of active encryption and potential ransomware impact.
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts associated with VILE ransomware in the Windows local temporary directory, indicating potential post-infection activity such as ransom note preparation or file staging.
Detects rapid succession of power-off, suspend, or destroy operations on virtual machines via esxcli or vim-cmd following an SSH login, a behavior pattern often associated with ESXi ransomware activity (e.g., Qilin).
Detects PE binaries associated with INC Ransom or Lynx ransomware families identified during the FortiBleed campaign. The rule flags files containing both family-specific identification strings and commands intended to delete Volume Shadow Copies to prevent system recovery.
Detects high-frequency file write activity combined with the creation of text files, which is a common behavior exhibited by ransomware during the encryption phase of an attack. The rule monitors for a large volume of file creations across a host and specific patterns indicative of ransom note generation.
Detects the creation of 'delete.me' files in critical Windows directories (specifically C:\Windows and SYSVOL paths). This behavior is associated with the Akira ransomware, which uses these marker files to coordinate domain-wide encryption tasks, often executed by the System account during the preparation phase of an attack.
This rule monitors Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) to detect high-volume file creation activity across multiple unique directories. By filtering out common file types, it identifies potential signs of mass file modification, staging for exfiltration, or malicious encryption characteristic of ransomware or data destructive operations.
Detects rapid file renaming of user-critical documents and media files to an .encrypted extension, indicative of mass file encryption activity typically associated with ransomware.
This rule detects potential ransomware or remote access trojan (RAT) activity by identifying either specific command-line indicators (/encrypt, /decrypt) or a high volume of file modifications (create, modify, or rename) across multiple directories within a short time frame, which is characteristic of mass file encryption operations.
This rule detects multi-stage behavior associated with the BQTLock ransomware, including C2 network communication, execution of loaders (PyInstaller-based) from common writable directories, suspicious child process spawning, unauthorized OpenSSH service usage potentially indicating privilege escalation, and mass file encryption indicated by both specific file extensions and bulk rename heuristics.
Detects the BQTLock ransomware distribution chain, where a PyInstaller-packaged loader executable (start.exe) is used to unpack and spawn the primary BQT.exe ransomware payload. The detection monitors for process creation events where start.exe exhibits typical PyInstaller command-line artifacts (e.g., _MEIPASS) and initiates BQT.exe, which is associated with malicious activities including UAC bypass and file encryption.
Detects high-frequency S3 PutObject requests that utilize Customer-Provided Encryption Keys (SSE-C). A high count of such operations within a short window can be indicative of ransomware activity, where an adversary encrypts data within the victim's cloud storage using their own keys to prevent access by the owner.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying processes that perform a high volume of file write, create, or rename operations across a large number of unique file paths within a short timeframe. It also includes a heuristic check for filenames containing 'inc' or 'lynx', often associated with specific ransomware variants.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
Detects rapid succession of power-off, suspend, or destroy operations on virtual machines via esxcli or vim-cmd following an SSH login, a behavior pattern often associated with ESXi ransomware activity (e.g., Qilin).
Detects DNS queries to Gofile infrastructure originating from processes executing from typically transient directories (AppData or Temp). This behavior is characteristic of VILE ransomware, which stages compressed user files in these directories before exfiltrating them via Gofile as part of a double-extortion strategy.
This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
This rule detects a high volume of network share connections (SMB/CIFS) from a single device to multiple remote IPs within a short timeframe. This behavior can be indicative of ransomware attempting to encrypt files across network shares, or other forms of rapid lateral movement and data access. The rule specifically looks for connections on ports 445 or 139 initiated by common user or system processes like explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe.
This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Detects the modification of an Azure Storage account's encryption settings to use a Key Vault for Customer-Managed Keys (CMK). This activity can be indicative of ransomware attacks where adversaries switch to an attacker-controlled key and then delete it, rendering all data in the storage account inaccessible.
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