Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
577 detections
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Detects the creation of 'delete.me' files in critical Windows directories (specifically C:\Windows and SYSVOL paths). This behavior is associated with the Akira ransomware, which uses these marker files to coordinate domain-wide encryption tasks, often executed by the System account during the preparation phase of an attack.
Detects the use of native Windows administration utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic, powershell) to delete shadow copies, modify boot configurations to disable recovery, or remove backup catalogs, a behavior typically performed by ransomware groups like The Gentlemen to prevent system recovery.
Detects a sequence of events on a single host within a 10-minute window involving both the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies (using vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe) and the execution of ESXi management commands (using esxcli or vmware binaries). This behavioral pattern is often indicative of ransomware attempting to inhibit system recovery and interfere with virtualized infrastructure components concurrently.
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe to disable automatic Windows recovery or suppress boot failure notifications. Adversaries often perform this action during the impact phase of an attack to prevent system restoration after data destruction or ransomware encryption.
This rule detects when a single process modifies or creates three or more YAML files ('.yaml' or '.yml' extensions) within folders containing 'config' or 'pipeline' in their path, within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate an attacker modifying configuration or deployment files, potentially for persistence, defense evasion, or impact.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin) to delete volume shadow copies, disable system recovery, or remove backup catalogs, which are common actions taken by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
Detects the execution of vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe with command-line arguments intended to delete or resize Volume Shadow Copies. This is a common technique used by ransomware to prevent system recovery and inhibit administrative rollback of file changes.
Detects a sequence of events on a single host within a 10-minute window involving both the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies (using vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe) and the execution of ESXi management commands (using esxcli or vmware binaries). This behavioral pattern is often indicative of ransomware attempting to inhibit system recovery and interfere with virtualized infrastructure components concurrently.
Detects Akira ransomware-associated PowerShell script execution that attempts to terminate backup, virtualization, and database services (such as VMware, Veeam, Hyper-V, and MSSQL) and inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies or disabling boot recovery features.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware activity aimed at preventing system recovery.
Detects indicators of ransomware-related anti-forensic behavior, including the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin or wmic, disabling system recovery via bcdedit, and the clearing of Windows event logs via wevtutil or system event log clearing events.
This rule detects various methods used to copy or access the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit), a common technique used by attackers to dump domain credentials. The rule monitors for the use of ntdsutil with 'ifm' (install from media) arguments, vssadmin to create volume shadow copies of the NTDS file, esentutl directly interacting with the NTDS database path, and common file copy utilities attempting to copy the NTDS.dit file.
Detects the execution of manage-bde.exe with command-line arguments designed to enable encryption, disable/delete BitLocker protectors, or modify authentication keys. This pattern is indicative of ransomware abuse, specifically actors attempting to encrypt drives and destroy recovery capabilities, particularly when spawned from scripting or shell environments like PowerShell, CMD, or WMI.
Detects the execution of manage-bde.exe with command-line arguments designed to enable encryption, disable/delete BitLocker protectors, or modify authentication keys. This pattern is indicative of ransomware abuse, specifically actors attempting to encrypt drives and destroy recovery capabilities, particularly when spawned from scripting or shell environments like PowerShell, CMD, or WMI.
Detects the execution of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit) used to inhibit system recovery or modify boot configuration, such as deleting shadow copies or disabling recovery features. The rule further flags these actions when executed by suspicious parent processes, processes outside of standard system paths, or via WMI/DCOM interfaces frequently associated with ransomware and lateral movement.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or startup of virtual machines using common administrative tools such as PowerShell (Hyper-V), vmrun (VMware), VBoxManage (VirtualBox), and vSphere CLI tools. Such activities can be indicators of adversary efforts to create hidden virtual environments, stage malicious payloads, or perform unauthorized administrative actions on virtualized infrastructure.
Detects the modification of an Azure Storage account's encryption settings to use a Key Vault for Customer-Managed Keys (CMK). This activity can be indicative of ransomware attacks where adversaries switch to an attacker-controlled key and then delete it, rendering all data in the storage account inaccessible.
Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies using 'vssadmin' or 'wmic' commands, which is a common tactic used by ransomware to prevent system recovery.
This rule detects potential Akira ransomware activity by correlating three distinct malicious phases on a network: first, the deletion of volume shadow copies using vssadmin, wmic, or powershell; second, the disabling of system recovery features via bcdedit or wbadmin; and third, high-volume file renaming (indicating encryption) across multiple endpoints. The rule aggregates these events to identify coordinated campaign activity across at least two hosts.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell commands. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware or other malicious activity aimed at inhibiting system recovery by removing backups.
Detects the execution of command-line tools associated with virtual machine management (ESXi CLI, PowerCLI, Hyper-V). The rule monitors for specific process executions (esxcli, vim-cmd, powershell) that involve administrative VM actions such as creating or starting virtual machines, which may indicate malicious VM orchestration, data destruction, or persistence attempts in virtualized environments.
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