Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user account performs a device configuration change (such as updating compliance policies) followed by a potentially destructive operation (Wipe, Retire, or Delete) on the same device or entity within a 6-hour window. This behavior often suggests unauthorized administrative activity or a malicious insider attempting to disable security controls before removing access or destroying data.
Detects mass deletion of files related to backups, archives, or disaster recovery across multiple distinct devices within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to destroy backup infrastructure to prevent system recovery following a disruptive event such as ransomware deployment.
Detects the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies using native Windows utilities like WMIC or PowerShell cmdlets (Get-WmiObject, Get-CimInstance) targeting Win32_ShadowCopy. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware preparation to inhibit system recovery prior to encryption, as observed in attacks involving the Akira ransomware.
Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables
Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables
Detects coordinated activity where a PowerShell process executes multiple distinct administrative utilities (such as wevtutil, vssadmin, wbadmin, or bcdedit) to perform destructive actions like clearing event logs, deleting shadow copies, or disabling system recovery settings. This rule uses correlation to identify sequences of at least three distinct commands and utilities, reducing false positives associated with single administrative tasks.
This rule detects the use of the Windows Boot Configuration Data Editor (bcdedit.exe) to modify system recovery settings. Specifically, it looks for attempts to disable recovery features or instruct the boot manager to ignore failures. Such modifications are common in ransomware and destructive attacks to prevent users from using Windows recovery tools to restore the system or access backups.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities 'vssadmin.exe' and 'wmic.exe' to delete Volume Shadow Copies. This activity is a common tactic used by ransomware and other malicious actors to prevent system recovery by destroying backups, and is classified as Inhibit System Recovery.
This rule detects the use of the 'bcdedit.exe' utility to modify Windows Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings to disable system recovery features, such as boot recovery or automatic failure handling. Such actions are commonly performed by ransomware or other destructive malware to prevent system restoration after encryption or data damage.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic, diskshadow, and bcdedit to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent system recovery. The rule explicitly excludes designated backup servers to reduce noise from legitimate management activities.
This rule detects the use of the Windows native utility 'wbadmin.exe' to delete the backup catalog. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware or other malicious activity aimed at inhibiting system recovery by removing the ability to restore data from built-in Windows backup utilities.
This rule monitors for high-volume deletion of Azure Recovery Services backup items or vaults performed by a single user across multiple subscriptions or regions within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to inhibit system recovery by destroying cloud backups before performing other destructive operations like ransomware or data wiping.
This rule monitors for high-volume deletion of Azure Recovery Services backup items or vaults performed by a single user across multiple subscriptions or regions within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to inhibit system recovery by destroying cloud backups before performing other destructive operations like ransomware or data wiping.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic, diskshadow, and bcdedit to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent system recovery. The rule explicitly excludes designated backup servers to reduce noise from legitimate management activities.
This rule detects hosts exhibiting behavior consistent with an active ransomware or destructive attack in progress, by correlating five distinct attack-chain stages within a rolling 24-hour window: environment/AD enumeration, network share discovery, lateral movement via RDP, credential dumping, and backup/recovery destruction.
Detects potential Cl0p ransomware activity by correlating the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies or backup catalogs with a subsequent burst of file creation, modification, or renaming activity on the same device. This behavior is indicative of ransomware preparing to encrypt files by inhibiting system recovery, followed by the mass encryption stage, while filtering out known administrative and legitimate software update activity.
This rule detects unauthorized access or modifications to hardware watchdog device files (/dev/watchdog, /dev/watchdog0, /dev/misc/watchdog, /dev/FTWDT101_watchdog) on Linux systems. Adversaries may manipulate these files to disable the hardware watchdog's automatic reboot functionality, potentially to maintain persistence or to ensure system stability while performing malicious actions without the risk of an unexpected forced reboot.
Detects malicious usage of bcdedit.exe to weaken system boot security. The rule flags commands that disable Windows Recovery (WinRE), boot integrity checks, driver signature enforcement, or force legacy boot policies, which are often used by ransomware like TOKYOCORE to prevent system recovery and hinder defensive remediation.
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe to modify boot configuration data in a way that disables system recovery features, ignores boot failures, or bypasses integrity checks. This activity is often associated with ransomware or malicious persistence mechanisms aimed at preventing system recovery or loading unsigned drivers.
Detects the use of vssadmin.exe to delete all volume shadow copies with the '/all' and '/quiet' flags. This technique is commonly employed by ransomware, including TOKYOCORE, to prevent system recovery by destroying backup snapshots prior to file encryption.
Detects unauthorized write or modification access to core Windows boot-related files such as bootmgr, winload.efi, and the BCD store. This activity is indicative of destructive wiper malware attempting to render the operating system unbootable to prevent recovery, a technique observed in the TOKYOCORE wiper campaign.
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