Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

10 detections

Detects SMS pumping attacks via bulk SMS API requests
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
This rule detects a high volume of HTTP POST requests to known SMS API providers (Twilio, Nexmo, Vonage) from a single source IP address within a short timeframe. This pattern is indicative of a 'pumping attack' or SMS fraud, where an attacker attempts to generate a large number of SMS messages, often to premium rate numbers, to incur charges or exploit vulnerabilities in billing systems. The threshold is set to 20 requests within 60 seconds from the same source.
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
0010
This rule detects a potential SMS Pumping Attack, specifically targeting bulk One-Time Password (OTP) requests. It triggers when a single source IP address makes more than 50 HTTP POST requests to a URI containing "send_sms" within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exploit SMS delivery systems by repeatedly requesting OTPs, potentially leading to financial costs for the service provider or overwhelming users with messages.
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
004
KQL Query from file: DEVMAN ransomware detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
9290
KQL Query
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
2177
KQL Query from file: Hunting Rogue Endpoints via SMB Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
9067
KQL Query
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
4049
KQL Query from file: CVE-2024-38200 NTLM Exposure Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
2034
This query identifies files that are copied to a device over SMB, then executed within a
specified threshold. Default is 5 seconds, but is configurable by tweaking the value for
ToleranceInSeconds.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
1035
First query digs in print spooler drivers folder for any file creations,
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0022