Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
192 detections
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Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
Detects malicious HTML pages commonly used in ClickFix-style phishing campaigns that intercept keyboard events (specifically blocking devtools and view-source shortcuts) and display fraudulent verification prompts to lure users into executing malicious actions.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
Detects anomalous thread execution call stacks indicative of the SparroWocky anti-forensic evasion technique. This method involves spoofing thread start addresses and call stacks by injecting or manually manipulating stack frames to include legitimate-looking system functions (e.g., BaseFlushAppcompatCacheWorker, BaseCheckVDMp) alongside malicious execution patterns involving NtDelayExecution and SleepEx to hide the true origin of code execution.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that enumerate system, security, or virtualization-related artifacts. It specifically looks for the usage of WMI and PowerShell cmdlets (e.g., Get-Process, Get-WmiObject) to query for known analysis tools, debuggers, or virtualization software strings, which is a common behavior of malware attempting to identify and evade sandbox or analyst environments.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
This rule detects PowerShell processes spawned directly or indirectly by LNK files that include command-line arguments indicative of anti-analysis, anti-VM, or reconnaissance techniques. These include querying for specific WMI classes (e.g., Win32_Process, Win32_ComputerSystem), checking for virtualization artifacts (e.g., 'virtualbox', 'vmware', 'qemu', 'sandboxie'), or querying security and hardware information (e.g., 'antivirusproduct', 'securitycenter2', 'getmac').
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to identify security software, virtualization environments, or sandbox analysis tools. The rule monitors for the enumeration of security processes, WMI queries for system hardware information (e.g., BIOS, Disk, Video Controller), and checks for registry keys or driver files associated with virtualization software (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox). This behavior is commonly observed in malware attempting to evade automated analysis.
Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
Detects rapid, repetitive queries to system hardware identifiers (DMI, CPU info, virtualization attributes) commonly used by adversaries for reconnaissance or environment awareness (sandbox detection). The rule identifies suspicious behavior by tracking the execution of commands like 'cat', 'grep', or 'dmidecode' that target sensitive Linux system files (e.g., /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/*, /proc/cpuinfo) when performed by non-standard parent processes in a short time window.
Detects a specific evasion behavior associated with the NinjaMare malware, where a process idles for at least 7 minutes before moving its window to off-screen coordinates during automated mouse or keystroke input, followed by restoring the window to its original position.
Detects evidence of sandbox or virtualization evasion by identifying discovery commands that query WMI hypervisor classes or common virtual machine hardware strings. This activity is considered a precursor (pre-detonation check) when followed by the execution of encoded PowerShell commands or Python scripts on the same host, which is characteristic of the CRPx0 ClickFix attack chain.
Detects evidence of sandbox or virtualization evasion by identifying discovery commands that query WMI hypervisor classes or common virtual machine hardware strings. This activity is considered a precursor (pre-detonation check) when followed by the execution of encoded PowerShell commands or Python scripts on the same host, which is characteristic of the CRPx0 ClickFix attack chain.
Detects evidence of sandbox or virtualization evasion by identifying discovery commands that query WMI hypervisor classes or common virtual machine hardware strings. This activity is considered a precursor (pre-detonation check) when followed by the execution of encoded PowerShell commands or Python scripts on the same host, which is characteristic of the CRPx0 ClickFix attack chain.
Detects execution of the GRAYRABBIT loader (specifically 7z.exe from the Users\Public\Documents staging path) in environments exhibiting low process count activity (<= 50 processes). This behavior is consistent with anti-sandbox checks used by this loader to gate XOR key derivation for payload decryption.
This rule monitors for specific PowerShell command-line patterns often associated with malicious activity, including 'ClickFix' clipboard-paste lures (using iex/irm with sleep timers), evasion techniques involving pscustomobject/ScriptBlock, and WinHttp COM object usage for stage-2 payload fetching. These patterns are characteristic of adversary attempts to bypass security controls and download secondary implants.
Detects rapid, repetitive queries to system hardware identifiers (DMI, CPU info, virtualization attributes) commonly used by adversaries for reconnaissance or environment awareness (sandbox detection). The rule identifies suspicious behavior by tracking the execution of commands like 'cat', 'grep', or 'dmidecode' that target sensitive Linux system files (e.g., /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/*, /proc/cpuinfo) when performed by non-standard parent processes in a short time window.
Detects a specific evasion behavior associated with the NinjaMare malware, where a process idles for at least 7 minutes before moving its window to off-screen coordinates during automated mouse or keystroke input, followed by restoring the window to its original position.
This rule monitors for specific PowerShell command-line patterns often associated with malicious activity, including 'ClickFix' clipboard-paste lures (using iex/irm with sleep timers), evasion techniques involving pscustomobject/ScriptBlock, and WinHttp COM object usage for stage-2 payload fetching. These patterns are characteristic of adversary attempts to bypass security controls and download secondary implants.
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