Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects OAuth consent grants or permission additions in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) audit logs that occur in conjunction with device login flow artifacts. This pattern is indicative of 'ConsentFix' or device code phishing attacks, where users are manipulated into authorizing malicious applications, potentially bypassing MFA requirements by using the device code flow.
Detects OAuth application consent grants or modifications where the application is granted sensitive permissions including Mail.Read, Directory.Read.All, or User.Read.All. These permissions can be abused by attackers to exfiltrate email data or map the organization's directory.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application sensitive permissions, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack where an adversary lures a user into authorizing a malicious application to access their email, files, or directory data.
Detects successful OAuth device code authentication flows targeted at sensitive Microsoft cloud resources (Exchange Online, SharePoint, Teams, Graph) originating from unmanaged or non-compliant devices. This pattern is often indicative of consent phishing or device code phishing attacks where an adversary obtains a device token to gain long-term unauthorized access to user data.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
This rule detects when a user or administrator grants consent to an Azure AD or Office 365 application for permissions that provide significant access to mail, files, contacts, or directory data. This activity is a common vector for illicit OAuth consent attacks, where adversaries gain persistent access to sensitive data without requiring direct user credentials.
Detects network and process execution activity involving Google or Microsoft OAuth2 token endpoints from non-browser and non-trusted processes. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempts, where malicious tools (e.g., curl, python) are used to access authentication endpoints to bypass standard user interaction.
Detects successful OAuth application consent grants or service principal role assignments involving sensitive permissions, such as read access to mail, contacts, files, or directory information. This activity is a common indicator of OAuth-based phishing or unauthorized persistent access to cloud resources.
This rule detects when a user grants an OAuth application permissions within an Azure AD or Office 365 environment, specifically monitoring for highly sensitive permissions such as 'Mail.Read', 'Files.ReadWrite', 'User.Read.All', or 'offline_access'. The rule cross-references the application ID against a known list to filter out pre-authorized applications and assigns a risk score based on the combination of granted permissions, flagging suspicious, unrecognized applications.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application permissions for high-privilege scopes such as 'mail.read', 'files.readwrite', or 'offline_access'. This behavior is frequently indicative of OAuth consent phishing campaigns targeting Microsoft Entra ID environments to gain unauthorized access to user data and maintain persistence via stolen access tokens.
Detects high-volume, suspicious enumeration of HR and Payroll related information via Microsoft Graph API. The rule identifies anomalous behavior such as rapid bulk pagination, usage of suspicious user agents, and specific targeting of sensitive fields (e.g., department, job title) or keywords commonly associated with HR and financial data, likely indicating the use of a stolen OAuth token.
Detects anomalous activities targeting SaaS CRM applications (Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics 365, HubSpot), including high-volume bulk exports, off-hours access, mass API queries for sensitive objects, and suspicious OAuth token grants.
Detects anomalous device code authentication sessions originating from non-corporate IP addresses using common command-line user agents, which are immediately followed by a device registration event by the same user. This pattern is indicative of OAuth device code phishing, where an attacker tricks a user into authorizing a malicious application to access their account.
Monitors successful sign-in events that utilize the OAuth 2.0 Device Code authorization protocol. While legitimate for headless applications or IoT devices, this flow is frequently abused by attackers for credential harvesting and phishing attacks to gain unauthorized access to user accounts and cloud resources.
Detects potential identity pivoting by correlating signs of developer workstation compromise (e.g., shell spawning from IDE/node processes) with subsequent anomalous cloud console or API access from the same or associated identity within a short timeframe. This rule monitors both Azure Sign-in logs and AWS CloudTrail activity for suspicious patterns following endpoint indicators.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application sensitive permissions, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack where an adversary lures a user into authorizing a malicious application to access their email, files, or directory data.
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID application configurations, specifically updating the 'RedirectUri' or 'ReplyUrls' to point to potentially external or unauthorized domains. This technique is often used in OAuth-based application-consent phishing campaigns to redirect authorization codes to adversary-controlled servers.
Detects OAuth application consent grants or modifications where the application is granted sensitive permissions including Mail.Read, Directory.Read.All, or User.Read.All. These permissions can be abused by attackers to exfiltrate email data or map the organization's directory.
This rule detects potential token theft or MFA bypass by correlating successful MFA-satisfied interactive sign-ins with subsequent non-interactive sign-ins (token refreshes) occurring within a 60-minute window from different IP addresses for the same user. This pattern is indicative of an attacker stealing a session token (e.g., via session cookie theft or AiTM phishing) and using it to authenticate from a different location.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Device Code Phishing Attempt
Cortex XDR
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary is trying to steal application access tokens.
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