Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
771 detections
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Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID application configurations, specifically updating the 'RedirectUri' or 'ReplyUrls' to point to potentially external or unauthorized domains. This technique is often used in OAuth-based application-consent phishing campaigns to redirect authorization codes to adversary-controlled servers.
Detects attempts to list, read, create, update, or delete Kubernetes secrets through the Kubernetes API server. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials or manipulate application configurations.
This rule detects when a user grants an OAuth application consent to access high-privilege scopes in an Azure environment. It specifically flags instances where the consent is not for all principals and the user performing the action is not a Global Administrator, which may indicate an attacker-controlled application being granted access to sensitive data or resources.
This rule detects when a user grants an OAuth application consent to access high-privilege scopes in an Azure environment. It specifically flags instances where the consent is not for all principals and the user performing the action is not a Global Administrator, which may indicate an attacker-controlled application being granted access to sensitive data or resources.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
Detects suspicious interactions with Google Cloud Pub/Sub APIs occurring shortly after an OAuth2 token request, specifically when the activity is performed by processes other than standard Google Cloud SDK tools (gcloud, gsutil, etc.). This behavior may indicate an attempt to utilize stolen OAuth tokens to exfiltrate or manipulate data within a GCP environment.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Device Code Phishing Attempt
Cortex XDR
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary is trying to gain access to a user's application access token.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
Detects anomalous activities targeting SaaS CRM applications (Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics 365, HubSpot), including high-volume bulk exports, off-hours access, mass API queries for sensitive objects, and suspicious OAuth token grants.
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID application configurations, specifically updating the 'RedirectUri' or 'ReplyUrls' to point to potentially external or unauthorized domains. This technique is often used in OAuth-based application-consent phishing campaigns to redirect authorization codes to adversary-controlled servers.
Detects signs of a session hijacking attack using the OAuth device code grant flow, specifically identifying the initial device code authorization followed by suspicious post-authentication activity like mass data access via Microsoft Graph API or the creation of mailbox forwarding rules.
This rule detects when a non-administrative user grants an application high-privilege OAuth scopes (such as mail reading, file access, or directory management) within an Azure/Microsoft 365 environment. Such consent grants can be used by attackers to maintain persistence and bypass MFA by gaining delegated access to sensitive resources.
Detects automated scripts or command-line utilities initiating connections to Microsoft authentication endpoints using OAuth device code authorization parameters. This behavior is indicative of PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) tools, such as EvilTokens, attempting to perform device code OAuth flows on behalf of an attacker to gain unauthorized access.
Detects suspicious child process activity originating from common IDEs or AI language server processes that indicates AWS credential exfiltration. The rule monitors for command-line patterns indicative of credential dumping or exfiltration, such as the use of AWS CLI commands, curl, or npx with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) in conjunction with attempts to access sensitive environment variables or redirect output.
This rule detects persistent Microsoft 365 access established by an attacker using OAuth refresh tokens, typically following a device_code phishing attack. It correlates three key events: initial device_code sign-ins from non-compliant or non-managed devices, the subsequent consent to a new OAuth application (likely attacker-controlled) from the same user and within a short timeframe, and finally, Microsoft Graph mail API access originating from that newly registered application. This sequence indicates an adversary has successfully phished a user, gained consent for a malicious application, and is now using it to access the user's mailbox data.
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of device code phishing, where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application.
Detects non-interactive Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token requests originating from unmanaged, deviceless sessions that falsely claim MFA satisfaction. The detection focuses on specific user agents known to be associated with automated token replay attacks and looks for multiple unique token identifiers per user session, which is indicative of credential or token theft rather than standard service account or application activity.
Detects network and process execution activity involving Google or Microsoft OAuth2 token endpoints from non-browser and non-trusted processes. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempts, where malicious tools (e.g., curl, python) are used to access authentication endpoints to bypass standard user interaction.
This rule detects successful sign-ins using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code Flow. This flow is often abused in phishing attacks (device code phishing) where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application. A successful sign-in using this method could indicate a compromised account or a successful phishing attempt.
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