Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
771 detections
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This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
This rule detects anomalous access to cloud services, specifically Salesforce, Drift, Salesloft, HubSpot, and Marketo, that may indicate OAuth token abuse. It identifies scenarios where a high volume of actions (8 or more) occur within a short timeframe (3 hours or less) from a single IP address but with multiple unique user agents (2 or more). The detection is further refined by looking for actions related to 'Add delegated permission grant' or 'Create service principal', which are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges after gaining access through a compromised OAuth token.
Detects the VSCode executable making direct web requests to the GitHub API. This may indicate a malicious extension exfiltrating or validating stolen OAuth tokens, as demonstrated in the 1-click GitHub Dev/VSCode webview attack.
Detects the presence of 'access_token' and 'step' strings in conjunction with 'POST' and 'application/json' within network traffic or files, indicating potential C2 communication or data exfiltration related to the Remus malware distribution ecosystem.
This rule detects potential OAuth token abuse by correlating credential consent grants with subsequent unusual cloud access patterns from different geographic locations. It looks for activities like adding a service principal, adding OAuth2 permission grants, or consenting to an application, followed by access to specific cloud applications (Salesforce, Drift, Slack, Microsoft 365, Workday) from an IP address that does not match the IP address from which the consent was granted. The rule aggregates these events and triggers if there are at least 4 related events within a 6-hour window.
Detects unauthorized access, creation, or modification of sensitive credential and token files (e.g., OAuth tokens, AWS credentials, gcloud tokens) in common user directories like AppData or .config by processes other than established browsers or legitimate cloud CLI tools. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or SaaS pivot attacks.
Detects Google Workspace OAuth authorizations requesting the Chrome native client ID, which has been observed to be used by threat actors like Tycoon 2FA to mint tokens for illicit access.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line tools like curl, wget, or PowerShell to query OAuth/token-related endpoints (e.g., /token, oauth, access_token). The rule filters out expected parent processes (e.g., shells, IDEs, common build tools) to identify potentially malicious attempts to steal application access tokens.
Detects OAuth token theft via malicious redirect URI manipulation
Identifies outbound network connections to the Microsoft Device Code authentication endpoint, which may indicate phishing attempts (e.g., via PhaaS kits like Kali365).
Monitors for device code authentication via uncommon Family of Client IDs (FOCI) applications. This rule identifies successful device code authentications where the application ID (AppId) has been observed fewer than 5 times, indicating potentially rare or newly introduced applications. This could be indicative of an adversary attempting to use a malicious application for device code phishing.
This rule detects successful sign-ins using OAuth from residential IP addresses. It joins `SigninLogs` with `IdentityLogonEvents` to correlate successful OAuth authentications with user logon events. The intent is to identify potentially suspicious access, possibly indicating credential abuse or unauthorized access attempts from non-corporate or unexpected locations.
Detects new app installations, expansions of OAuth scopes, or the addition of collaborators to Slack applications. These activities can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistent access, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate data from Slack by leveraging malicious or compromised applications.
This rule looks for exposed pairs of credentials used for GitHub cloud identity federation in logs or artifacts. Leaked pairs let attackers mint tokens as your pipeline. Rotate federation settings and audit recent workflow runs.
This rule detects anomalous access to cloud services, specifically Salesforce, Drift, Salesloft, HubSpot, and Marketo, that may indicate OAuth token abuse. It identifies scenarios where a high volume of actions (8 or more) occur within a short timeframe (3 hours or less) from a single IP address but with multiple unique user agents (2 or more). The detection is further refined by looking for actions related to 'Add delegated permission grant' or 'Create service principal', which are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges after gaining access through a compromised OAuth token.
Detects unusual processes querying the AWS ECS metadata endpoint (169.254.170.2) to harvest container-level IAM roles and secrets. This rule specifically looks for network connections to the ECS metadata endpoint from processes commonly used for scripting or data transfer, such as node, bun, curl, and wget.
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged and non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of device code phishing, where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application.
Detects successful or anomalous authentications utilizing the Microsoft device code flow. Kali365 and other phishing-as-a-service platforms actively abuse this flow to register attacker devices, bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gaining unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 environments.
This rule detects attempts by package management processes (like npm or bun) to invoke the GitHub CLI (gh.exe) with commands that could be used to steal session tokens. This activity is suspicious as it suggests a potential supply-chain compromise targeting developer machines, where maintainers are high-value targets. The rule specifically looks for 'gh.exe' or 'gh' being executed with 'auth' and 'token' in the command line, initiated by 'node.exe', 'bun.exe', or 'npm.cmd'.
Detects attempts to list, read, create, update, or delete Kubernetes secrets via the Kubernetes API server. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive information or manipulate the environment.
This rule detects when a single caller performs multiple (3 or more) retrievals of Azure Storage Account Keys within a one-hour window. This activity can indicate an attempt to gain unauthorized access to storage resources or exfiltrate data.
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