Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP POST requests to github.com's /login/device/code endpoint that contain a 'client_id=' in the request body. This pattern is indicative of a device code authentication flow, which could be leveraged in phishing attacks (device code phishing) to steal application access tokens.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to github.com's /login/device/code endpoint containing a 'client_id=' parameter in the request body. This pattern is indicative of a device code authentication flow, which could be leveraged in phishing attacks (device code phishing) to steal application access tokens or facilitate unauthorized access to GitHub accounts.
Detects a suspicious Salesforce OAuth login followed by high-volume data exfiltration activity within a short period. This pattern is associated with the threat actor UNC6040, which uses malicious or compromised OAuth applications to steal data.
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/beyond-credentials-weaponizing-oauth-applications-persistent-cloud-access
This rule detects the creation of specific named pipes ('\imposecost' or '\imposingcost') which are known to be used by the 'Koh' tool. The 'Koh' tool is associated with credential access and privilege escalation techniques, often involving token impersonation or theft. Detection relies on Sysmon Event ID 17 or 18, which logs named pipe creation.
This rule detects changes to an application's Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) configuration within Azure. Such changes can include modifications to domain names, protocol usage (e.g., switching from HTTPS), the introduction of wildcards, or URIs pointing to uncontrolled domains. These types of modifications can be indicative of an attacker attempting to redirect traffic, establish persistence, or facilitate other malicious activities by altering how an application is accessed or interacts with external resources.
This rule detects attempts to search for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) via command-line interface (CLI) tools. It specifically looks for common JWT header prefixes ('eyJ0eXAiOi' and 'eyJhbGciOi') within command-line arguments of tools like 'find', 'findstr', 'select-string', and 'strings'. Threat actors often search for these tokens to steal them for purposes such as lateral movement or privilege escalation, as JWTs are widely used for authentication and authorization in various applications and services (e.g., Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud).
Detects potentially suspicious search for JWT tokens via CLI by looking for the string "eyJ0eX" or "eyJhbG".
JWT tokens are often used for access-tokens across various applications and services like Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, and others.
Threat actors may search for these tokens to steal them for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
JWT tokens are often used for access-tokens across various applications and services like Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, and others.
Threat actors may search for these tokens to steal them for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
This KQL provide a detailed audit listing of your tenant consented OAuth apps and their granted permissions and number of users consented.
Detects a user authorizing a Salesforce application via the '/setup/connect' page. This specific TTP is associated with ShinyHunters vishing campaigns where attackers impersonate IT staff and trick employees into entering a connection code, thereby granting a malicious application access to the organization's Salesforce environment.
Detects successful non-interactive sign-ins to Microsoft Graph using the Visual Studio Code (VSCode) application identity. This behavior was observed in a phishing campaign where threat actors tricked users into an OAuth flow to harvest tokens. These tokens were then used to access user data, such as emails, via the Graph API.
Detects data theft activity from Salesforce instances by the threat actor UNC6395, who leveraged compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Salesloft Drift third-party application. The detection is based on suspicious user agents and known malicious IP addresses used by the threat actor, specifically targeting the 'Drift' connected application.
Detects the use of known malicious or suspicious User-Agent strings associated with the UNC6395 data theft campaign targeting Salesforce instances.
This rule detects PRT token stealing on a device when exploiting the MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll, leveraging a WDAC audit policy to ingest missing Microsoft Defender for Endpoint events. This addresses a blind spot in default Defender for Endpoint detection.
Detects indicators of compromise (IOCs) and suspicious OAuth consent activity
linked to the Tycoon/ODx phishing kits. These campaigns impersonate Microsoft
OAuth apps to bypass MFA and harvest Microsoft 365 credentials.
linked to the Tycoon/ODx phishing kits. These campaigns impersonate Microsoft
OAuth apps to bypass MFA and harvest Microsoft 365 credentials.
This rule detects inbound emails containing URLs that are commonly used for OAuth consent phishing, where an attacker attempts to trick users into granting permissions to a malicious application.
This rule detects when an application consent operation occurs in Azure Active Directory, specifically looking for broad consent types such as 'AllPrincipals' or when an administrator has granted consent. This can indicate a malicious application gaining wide permissions within the Azure AD tenant.
Detects a non-interactive sign-in using a refresh token for the Microsoft Authentication Broker client, targeting the Device Registration Service (DRS) with the 'adrs_access' scope. This specific combination of attributes is highly indicative of an adversary using tools like ROADtools to register a malicious device in the tenant following a successful OAuth phishing attack.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in events where a user principal authenticates using a refresh token issued to the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) client, targeting the Device Registration Service (DRS) with the "adrs_access" OAuth scope. This pattern may indicate token-based access to DRS following an initial authorization code phishing or as a precursor to malicious device registration using tools like ROADtx.
Hypothesis: An adversary who has successfully phished a user for an OAuth authorization code or refresh token may use it in a non-interactive sign-in to abuse trusted first-party Microsoft applications for persistence or data exfiltration.
This rule detects two primary scenarios observed in such campaigns:
1. A refresh token issued to the Microsoft Authentication Broker is used to access the Device Registration Service (DRS) with the 'adrs_access' scope. This is indicative of an adversary registering a new device to gain persistence via a Primary Refresh Token (PRT).
2. A token is used by the Visual Studio Code application to access the Microsoft Graph API. This can be used by an attacker who has phished an authorization code to exfiltrate data like emails.
This rule detects two primary scenarios observed in such campaigns:
1. A refresh token issued to the Microsoft Authentication Broker is used to access the Device Registration Service (DRS) with the 'adrs_access' scope. This is indicative of an adversary registering a new device to gain persistence via a Primary Refresh Token (PRT).
2. A token is used by the Visual Studio Code application to access the Microsoft Graph API. This can be used by an attacker who has phished an authorization code to exfiltrate data like emails.
KQL Query
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