Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects unauthorized modifications to common Windows persistence registry keys, including 'Run' keys, the 'Winlogon Shell' value, and 'Image File Execution Options' (IFEO) debugger values. These modifications are commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or intercept process execution.
Detects modifications to the 'Debugger' registry value for the 'agntsvc.exe' executable under 'Image File Execution Options'. This technique, known as IFEO injection, is used by adversaries to gain persistence or privilege escalation by forcing a malicious binary to run whenever a specific process is launched.
This rule detects attempts to establish persistence for 'vds.exe' (Virtual Disk Service) by modifying the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry key to point its debugger to an executable located within the Windows Fonts directory. This technique is often used by adversaries to maintain access or elevate privileges, as the Fonts directory is typically writable by standard users and can be used to hide malicious executables.
This rule detects persistence attempts using Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger redirection for 'vds.exe'. Specifically, it looks for registry modifications where the 'debugger' value for 'vds.exe' points to an executable located within the 'Windows\Fonts' directory. This technique is often used by adversaries to maintain access or elevate privileges by hijacking legitimate application execution.
Detects an Image File Execution Options debugger value for vds.exe that redirects execution to an executable stored in Windows Fonts. This specific condition is often associated with the SprySOCKS component, indicating a potential malicious persistence mechanism rather than a common Windows artifact.
Detects the creation of the '.bun_ran' run-once marker in a temporary directory or suspicious Python '.pth' startup hooks (e.g., 'langchain_core-setup.pth') indicative of the Hades loader variant. The '.bun_ran' file acts as a marker for the loader, while '.pth' files can be used to inject malicious code into Python's import mechanism, achieving persistence or execution.
This rule detects attempts to modify the 'Image File Execution Options' (IFEO) registry key to set a debugger for an application. This technique is often used by adversaries for persistence, allowing them to execute their malicious code whenever the legitimate application starts. The rule specifically looks for network traffic (TCP, port 445, typically SMB) containing the strings 'Image File Execution Options' and 'Debugger' in a case-insensitive manner, indicating a potential attempt to manipulate this registry setting over the network.
Detects IFEO debugger key modification used for accessibility backdoors
Detects modifications to the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) or SilentProcessExit registry keys, which can be abused for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. Adversaries may use these mechanisms to attach debuggers or monitor programs to legitimate executables, causing malicious code to run when the target application starts or exits.
thx to Maurice Fielenbach for Sharing this Attack Path on Linkedin
thx to Maurice Fielenbach for Sharing this Attack Path on Linkedin
Detects modifications to specific Windows Registry keys under the `Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion` path, which are commonly used for autostart extensibility points (ASEPs). Specifically, it looks for changes to `Appinit_Dlls` and `Image File Execution Options` which can be abused for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
Detects suspicious registry modifications for IFEO entries which can be used by attackers for persistence.
This is based off of testing with Atomic Red Team tests - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1546.012
This is based off of testing with Atomic Red Team tests - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1546.012
Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to monitor the exit of another process
This query looks for persistence or priviledge escalation done using Windows Accessibility features.
It covers some of the techniques that could be used to utilize these features for malicious purposes,.
Including attaching a debugger using a registry config or overwriting these files.
Note: some developers might use such hacks for all sort of troubleshooting and testing purposes,.
But this better be prohibited, as it allows any account with access to the machine to run processes as SYSTEM.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015.
Tags: #AccessibilityFeatures, #StickyKeys, #ImageFileExecutionOptions, #Debugger, #PriviledgeEscalation, #Persistence.
It covers some of the techniques that could be used to utilize these features for malicious purposes,.
Including attaching a debugger using a registry config or overwriting these files.
Note: some developers might use such hacks for all sort of troubleshooting and testing purposes,.
But this better be prohibited, as it allows any account with access to the machine to run processes as SYSTEM.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015.
Tags: #AccessibilityFeatures, #StickyKeys, #ImageFileExecutionOptions, #Debugger, #PriviledgeEscalation, #Persistence.
Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to monitor the exit of another process
Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
Detects registry persistence technique using the GlobalFlags and SilentProcessExit keys
Detects registry persistence technique using the GlobalFlags and SilentProcessExit keys
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, RDP ransomware persists as Wadhrama.
The ransomware known as Wadhrama has been used in human-operated attacks that follow a particular pattern. The attackers often use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to a device or network, exfiltrate credentials, and maintain persistance.
The following query checks for possible Wadhrama-related activity, by detecting the technique these attackers have used in the past to dump credentials.
Other techniques used by the group associated with Wadhrama are listed under See also.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Wadhrama
The ransomware known as Wadhrama has been used in human-operated attacks that follow a particular pattern. The attackers often use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to a device or network, exfiltrate credentials, and maintain persistance.
The following query checks for possible Wadhrama-related activity, by detecting the technique these attackers have used in the past to dump credentials.
Other techniques used by the group associated with Wadhrama are listed under See also.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Wadhrama
This query was originally published in a threat analytics report about the group known to other security researchers as APT32 or OceanLotus
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favorite techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files. The group has weaponized files with exploits for the following vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2017-11882 - Software update
2. CVE-2017-0199 - Software update
The following query detects known malicious files associated with the group's campaigns.
See Detect malicious network activity associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favorite techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files. The group has weaponized files with exploits for the following vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2017-11882 - Software update
2. CVE-2017-0199 - Software update
The following query detects known malicious files associated with the group's campaigns.
See Detect malicious network activity associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
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