Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects persistence attempts using Component Object Model (COM) hijacking by modifying HKCU CLSID InProcServer32 registry keys. The rule specifically identifies instances where the registry value points to a DLL file located within the user's AppData or LocalAppData directories, excluding typical system or program directories, as seen in sideloading persistence chains.
This rule detects persistence attempts via Component Object Model (COM) hijacking. It identifies a specific process 'December_blob.exe' creating or modifying registry keys associated with COM CLSIDs (specifically InprocServer32) and simultaneously dropping or utilizing a file named 'hvcsrv.dll' within an 'IdentityNexusIntegration' directory. This combination of registry modification and file system activity suggests the registration of a malicious COM object to achieve execution persistence.
Detects the creation or modification of InprocServer32 registry keys within CLSID paths in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. These registry locations are frequently abused by adversaries to achieve persistence or execute arbitrary code (COM hijacking) by pointing the server path to a malicious DLL or executable.
Detects a non-privileged user creating a new DLL file within the C:\ProgramData\CrossDevice\ directory on a system that has specific COM registration keys (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0} or {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}) pointing to potentially missing or hijacked InprocServer32 paths. This is a common technique used for COM Hijacking or Persistence via phantom DLL loading.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
Detects a SYSTEM-level dllhost.exe process, associated with specific COM object instantiation (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0}), loading a DLL from the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker-planted DLL being unmarshaled through a crafted OBJREF, effectively bypassing security controls like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL.
Detects the modification of InProcServer32 registry keys within the user's Classes/CLSID hive to point to a file located in the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly used for COM hijacking to achieve persistence or execute arbitrary code under the user's context.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
Detects modifications to registry keys associated with the 'ms-settings' COM object, specifically targeting the shell open command or DelegateExecute value. This technique, commonly referred to as 'ms-settings' hijacking, is used by adversaries to achieve persistence or elevated execution by redirecting legitimate COM object references to malicious payloads.
Detects modifications to registry keys associated with the 'ms-settings' COM object, specifically targeting the shell open command or DelegateExecute value. This technique, commonly referred to as 'ms-settings' hijacking, is used by adversaries to achieve persistence or elevated execution by redirecting legitimate COM object references to malicious payloads.
Detects persistence attempts using Component Object Model (COM) hijacking by modifying HKCU CLSID InProcServer32 registry keys. The rule specifically identifies instances where the registry value points to a DLL file located within the user's AppData or LocalAppData directories, excluding typical system or program directories, as seen in sideloading persistence chains.
Detects the modification of InProcServer32 registry keys within the user's Classes/CLSID hive to point to a file located in the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly used for COM hijacking to achieve persistence or execute arbitrary code under the user's context.
Detects modifications to the 'InProcServer32' registry key within HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID. This activity, which involves pointing a CLSID to a library file located in non-standard user-writable directories (like AppData), is a common technique for COM object hijacking used to achieve persistence or code execution.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the InprocServer32 registry key for the specific CLSID {2155fee3-2419-4373-b102-6843707eb41f}, a technique used by malware to achieve persistence by hijacking COM object instantiation to load a malicious DLL.
Detects two distinct methods used for persistence and execution: 1) Addition of 'rundll32' to Windows Registry Run keys, often used to execute malicious code upon logon. 2) Creation or modification of COM InprocServer32 registry keys, a technique known as COM Hijacking used to load malicious DLLs when a legitimate COM object is initialized.
This rule detects potential COM hijacking of the CLSID InprocServer32 registry keys or unauthorized loading/creation of the 'EhStoreShell.dll' file. These behaviors are common indicators of persistence mechanisms or DLL side-loading where attackers redirect legitimate system calls to malicious code.
Detects modifications or creation of InprocServer32 COM registry keys by suspicious processes like mshta.exe or powershell.exe, which is indicative of COM Hijacking for persistence or privilege escalation.
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