Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'This query looks for changes to COM registry keys to point to files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\.
This can be used to enable COM hijacking for persistence.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
This can be used to enable COM hijacking for persistence.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
'This query identifies modifications to COM registry keys to point to executable files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.
The analytic detects the modification of the InProcServer32 registry key by reg.exe, indicative of potential COM hijacking. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. COM hijacking is significant as it allows adversaries to insert malicious code that executes in place of legitimate software, providing a means for persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, disrupt legitimate system components, and maintain long-term access to the compromised environment.
This analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block logs (EventCode 4104) containing the string "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*". This activity is significant because adversaries and malware, such as Conti ransomware, commonly use COM object creation via PowerShell for purposes like privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). Successful exploitation of this technique could lead to elevated privileges or persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects a suspicious process loading a COM object from wbemprox.dll, fastprox.dll, or wbemcomn.dll. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes not typically associated with them, excluding known legitimate processes and directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by threat actors to abuse COM objects for privilege escalation or evasion of detection mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
This analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.
This rule detects suspicious behaviors associated with the SOURGUM actor, as tracked by Microsoft. Specifically, it looks for the creation of processes with specific image paths related to 'Physmem.sys' or 'WimBootConfigurations.ini' within IME directories. Additionally, it identifies attempts to modify registry keys associated with Component Object Model (COM) objects, specifically InprocServer32 entries for CLSIDs {7c857801-7381-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24} and {cf4cc405-e2c5-4ddd-b3ce-5e7582d8c9fa}, using the 'reg add' command.
Detects PowerShell code that uses `GetTypeFromCLSID` in conjunction with `.ShellExecute(` to execute COM objects. This technique can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by adversaries.
This rule detects the execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments indicative of loading registered COM objects. Specifically, it looks for `rundll32.exe` processes where the command line contains both `{-sta` or `-localserver` and curly braces (`{`, `}`). This pattern is often used by adversaries to achieve persistence or privilege escalation by hijacking COM objects and executing malicious code through them.
Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects
load malicious registered COM objects
Detect use of scrobj.dll as this DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute
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