Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,234 detections
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Detects the setting of a registry inside the "\Shell\Open\Command" value with PowerShell classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace.
The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption.
These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.
The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption.
These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign
Detects Ryuk ransomware activity
Detects the setting of a custom protocol handler with the name "rogue".
Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
Detects the setting of the DLL that handles the custom protocol handler.
Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
Detects changes to the "Winlogon" registry key where a process will set the value of the "Shell" to a value that was observed being used by KamiKakaBot samples in order to achieve persistence.
Detects the setting of a new value in the Autorun key that is used by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.
Detects suspicious command line reg.exe tool adding key to RUN key in Registry
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder
Detect modification of the startup key to a path where a payload could be stored to be launched during startup
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects a possible persistence mechanism using RUN key for Windows Explorer and pointing to a suspicious folder
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
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