Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects modifications to the BootExecute registry key, which manages applications and services executed during system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute". This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to this key can indicate attempts to achieve persistence, load malicious code, or tamper with the boot process. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code at boot, or disrupt system operations.
This analytic identifies modifications to the SafeBoot registry keys, specifically within the Minimal and Network paths. Adversaries can use these keys to persist drivers or services in Safe Mode, with Network allowing network connections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to maintain persistence even in Safe Mode, potentially bypassing certain security measures and facilitating further malicious actions.
Detects modifications to the "Default" value of specific 'MyComputer' registry keys and their subkeys. This technique can be used by adversaries to establish persistence by pointing to a custom binary that will be launched when an associated action (e.g., opening 'My Computer') is executed. This method leverages less common registry locations for persistence compared to standard Run keys.
This rule detects specific command-line executions associated with Mustang Panda's activity, particularly targeting the Australian government, as reported by Lab52. The rule looks for two distinct patterns: the copying of 'SolidPDFCreator.dll' to a specific public user directory, and the modification of the Windows Registry 'Run' key to establish persistence for 'SolidPDF' using the same directory. These actions indicate an attempt to install and persist malicious software.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a registry run key that exhibits characteristics associated with the 'Small Sieve' malware. Specifically, it looks for a registry path containing '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\' combined with either the intentional typo 'Microsift' in the TargetObject or the string '.exe Platypus' in the Details field. These indicators are known to be used by the Small Sieve malware for persistence.
Detects the creation of a file named 'newdev.dll' in a user's AppData\Roaming directory. This specific file path and name are associated with the COLDSTEEL Remote Access Trojan (RAT) for persistence.
Detects the creation of a registry value in the ".wav\OpenWithProgIds" key with an uncommon name. This activity is associated with the SNAKE malware, as reported by CISA, which uses this technique for persistence.
Detects the creation of a specific '.url' file named 'file001.url' within the 'Recent' folder of Microsoft Office. This activity has been observed in potential exploitation attempts related to CVE-2023-36884, where adversaries drop such files to achieve persistence or execute malicious code.
Detects the creation of a file named "ErrorHandler.cmd" in the "C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\" directory. This file can be used as a persistence mechanism because its content is executed whenever certain tools under "C:\WINDOWS\System32\oobe\" (e.g., Setup.exe) fail to run.
Detects modifications to the 'User Shell Folders' registry key, specifically targeting the 'Startup' value. This key can be manipulated by adversaries to achieve persistence by launching malicious payloads during system startup.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving rundll32.exe launching runonce.exe with setupapi.dll and the InstallHinfSection function. This technique can be used by adversaries to achieve persistence by modifying registry run keys or executing arbitrary code via INF files, as setupapi.dll's InstallHinfSection function can call runonce.exe regardless of the INF file's content.
Detects when an attacker modifies values of the Disk Cleanup Handler in the registry to achieve persistence via autorun. The rule specifically looks for modifications to the 'Autorun', 'CleanupString', or 'PreCleanupString' registry values within the 'VolumeCaches' key, combined with specific executable names or common suspicious paths in the 'Details' field.
Yara rule that detects LimeRAT backdoor.
Yara rule that detects AgentRacoon backdoor.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
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