Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to Google Cloud IAM policies where permissions are granted that allow service account impersonation or key management (e.g., serviceAccountTokenCreator, serviceAccountKeyAdmin, workloadIdentityUser, serviceAccountUser). These roles are frequently abused by attackers to gain durable, persistent access or escalate privileges by generating tokens as highly-privileged service accounts without requiring an existing service account key.
Detects the usage of the Google Cloud IAM Credentials API to generate OAuth access tokens, OIDC ID tokens, sign JWTs, or sign blobs as a service account. This behavior indicates an identity assuming a service account's permissions, a common technique for privilege escalation or lateral movement in GCP environments.
This rule detects the creation of Temporary Access Passes (TAPs) via the Microsoft Graph API targeting highly privileged accounts. This activity could indicate an attacker abusing a service principal with UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All permissions to gain temporary access to critical accounts like Global Administrators, Privileged Role Administrators, or Security Administrators. The rule specifically looks for POST requests to the 'temporaryAccessPassMethods' endpoint in Microsoft Graph Activity Logs and correlates this with IdentityInfo to identify if the target user holds a privileged role.
Detects sign-ins by Global Administrators using a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) to the Azure Portal. This activity is indicative of potential credential abuse, especially in cross-tenant scenarios, as TAP can bypass MFA. The rule identifies instances where a Global Administrator role is assigned or where a user with 'globaladmin' in their UPN signs in with a TAP.
This rule detects the creation of a new service account key within Google Cloud Platform (GCP) via the 'iam.googleapis.com' API. Specifically, it looks for HTTP POST requests to URIs containing 'serviceAccounts' and 'keys'. This activity can be indicative of privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new key for an existing service account to gain persistent access or elevate their privileges.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to graph.microsoft.com with the URI containing 'roleAssignmentScheduleRequests'. This pattern is indicative of an Azure PIM (Privileged Identity Management) Just-in-Time role activation request, which is a mechanism for users to temporarily elevate their privileges within Azure AD. While a legitimate administrative action, it can also be used by attackers for privilege escalation.
This rule detects when an AWS IAM role is assumed, which can be a legitimate activity for temporary elevated access within an AWS environment. The detection is based on HTTP traffic to 'sts.amazonaws.com' with 'AssumeRole' in the URI, indicating a request to the AWS Security Token Service to assume an IAM role. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation techniques.
Entra ID TAP Sign In
Cortex XDR
Looks for a Temporary Access Pass in Entra ID
Detects when an API access service account is granted domain authority within Google Workspace. This action can be used by an attacker to gain persistent and elevated access to an organization's Google Workspace data and services by allowing a service account to impersonate users across the domain.
KQL Query from file: Detecting FIDO2 Passkey Abuse
'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
This query will find applications that have been granted Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions in which the corresponding user recently consented to. It can help identify applications that have been abused to gain access to user email.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
Detects when a role privilege is deleted in Google Workspace. This could indicate an attempt to remove or modify administrative access, potentially as part of a privilege de-escalation by an attacker to avoid detection, or to clean up after an attack.
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