Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
707 detections
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Detects the Sckit Go implant accessing sensitive local configuration and credential files, including SSH keys, cloud CLI tokens, and package manager credentials. The rule monitors for file read events initiated by processes identified as 'sckit' or processes with specific command line arguments.
Detects anomalous file access patterns by Semantic Kernel agent processes attempting to read sensitive host files such as SSH keys, configuration files, and credential stores. This activity is indicative of malicious use of agent file-transfer capabilities, potentially exploiting path traversal vulnerabilities or prompt injection to exfiltrate sensitive data from the host environment into the agent sandbox.
Detects anomalous file access patterns by Semantic Kernel agent processes attempting to read sensitive host files such as SSH keys, configuration files, and credential stores. This activity is indicative of malicious use of agent file-transfer capabilities, potentially exploiting path traversal vulnerabilities or prompt injection to exfiltrate sensitive data from the host environment into the agent sandbox.
Detects anomalous child processes spawned by a Langflow server process that subsequently search for sensitive information, such as cloud credentials or database connection strings, within the command line arguments. This behavioral pattern is indicative of remote code execution exploitation followed by credential harvesting, potentially targeting vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-33017.
Detects outbound HTTP/HTTPS POST requests where the URI, query string, or path contains evidence of sensitive credential material, such as AWS access keys, private key blocks, or common environment variable patterns, indicative of potential credential harvesting and exfiltration to an external destination.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware, which attempts to exfiltrate data from web browser-based cryptocurrency wallet extensions by targeting specific API endpoints and wallet extension IDs.
Detects unauthorized file creation within the /root/.hermes/loot/ directory and specific path combinations associated with the CARBONATO botnet's Hermes Agent. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting, specifically the exfiltration of AI API keys for various LLM providers.
Detects access to sensitive cryptocurrency wallet files (e.g., wallet.dat, keystore) by processes typically associated with LOLBins (Living-off-the-land Binaries) like PowerShell, MSBuild, or non-executable utilities. This activity is indicative of credential theft or data staging for exfiltration of cryptocurrency assets.
Detects anomalous, mass-access behavior targeting plaintext credential files, certificate stores, private keys, or password-manager databases located on general-purpose network shares. Such activity is often indicative of an adversary conducting discovery or collection of credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
StealC v2, the payload consistently delivered via FileFix campaigns, is capable of stealing cryptocurrency wallet data alongside credentials and VPN configs.
Detects unauthorized access to VPN configuration files associated with common VPN providers (CyberGhost, NordVPN, ExpressVPN). This behavior is characteristic of the Hannibal Stealer, which attempts to exfiltrate these files to compromise user VPN sessions and credentials. The rule filters out legitimate process access to minimize false positives.
This rule detects the creation of XML files matching the 'export_batch_*.xml' naming convention, which is consistent with the output pattern of the Dahua DeviceManager utility. Attackers often use this tool to export camera configuration files containing sensitive credentials (IP, Port, Username, Password). The rule flags activity where multiple such files are created in a short duration, suggesting potential mass exfiltration of camera credentials.
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects AI coding assistants and LLM agent frameworks attempting to access, read, or export sensitive credential files, registry hives, or application secrets. The rule monitors both file system operations on known secret locations and process execution patterns indicative of credential dumping or API token retrieval by these tools.
Detects AI coding assistants and LLM agent frameworks attempting to access, read, or export sensitive credential files, registry hives, or application secrets. The rule monitors both file system operations on known secret locations and process execution patterns indicative of credential dumping or API token retrieval by these tools.
Detects recovered scripts/payloads that harvest environment variables, API keys, bearer tokens, and Kubernetes secrets/configmaps into a variable named LOOT
Detects execution of GitLab Runner registration commands via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EID 4104). This rule identifies potentially sensitive configuration parameters, such as registration tokens or executor configurations, being passed in cleartext during the enrollment process.
Detects anomalous outbound network connections initiated by security and developer tooling (Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Telnyx). This behavior is consistent with supply-chain attacks, such as those attributed to the UNC6780/TeamPCP threat group, where compromised tooling is leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive cloud credentials or API keys to external, non-vendor infrastructure.
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