Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome user data file "login data."
This file is an SQLite database containing sensitive information, including saved passwords.
The detection leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts.
This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts by threat actors to extract and decrypt stored passwords, posing a risk to user credentials.
If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts and escalate their privileges within the environment.
This file is an SQLite database containing sensitive information, including saved passwords.
The detection leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts.
This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts by threat actors to extract and decrypt stored passwords, posing a risk to user credentials.
If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts and escalate their privileges within the environment.
Detects command-line activity indicating an attempt to extract generic passwords from Google Chrome or Brave browser credential storage, often associated with tools that access the 'Safe Storage' or similar password databases.
Detects Shai-Hulud / ChainDrop activity by correlating known malicious hashes, npm/Node/Bun execution, payload artifacts, IDE persistence, credential discovery, cloud metadata access, GitHub exfiltration, C2 domains, Ethereum RPC activity, staging files, persistence artifacts, and known IOC IP connections.
This rule detects macOS infostealer activity, such as AMOS, MacSync, or SHub, by identifying suspicious, correlated access to sensitive credential stores including the macOS Keychain, web browser credential databases (Chrome), SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallet configuration files. It uses a combination of path/command-line strings and generic indicators of credential harvesting behavior.
This rule detects PowerShell execution patterns indicative of fileless information stealer activity. It searches for specific command-line flags often associated with obfuscated or hidden script execution (e.g., -EncodedCommand, -nop -w hidden, IEX) combined with attempts to access or target sensitive files and tokens (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, msal.cache, AAD.BrokerPlugin) common in Microsoft 365 and browser-based credential theft.
Detects Shai-Hulud / ChainDrop activity by correlating known malicious hashes, npm/Node/Bun execution, payload artifacts, IDE persistence, credential discovery, cloud metadata access, GitHub exfiltration, C2 domains, Ethereum RPC activity, staging files, persistence artifacts, and known IOC IP connections.
This rule detects unauthorized access to the Google Chrome LevelDB sync data files. These files contain sensitive information, including synced passwords, and are often targeted by credential-stealing malware. The rule excludes known legitimate Chrome processes to minimize noise, alerting when an unknown or suspicious process interacts with this specific directory structure.
This rule detects PowerShell execution patterns indicative of fileless information stealer activity. It searches for specific command-line flags often associated with obfuscated or hidden script execution (e.g., -EncodedCommand, -nop -w hidden, IEX) combined with attempts to access or target sensitive files and tokens (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, msal.cache, AAD.BrokerPlugin) common in Microsoft 365 and browser-based credential theft.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access or memory-dump activity targeting chrome.exe, consistent with extraction of the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key or wrapped identity/UV private keys used to decrypt synced passkey credentials (Golden Pass-ta-key attack). Excludes known legitimate crash-dump and diagnostic tooling (WerFault, crashpad_handler, procdump, Chrome itself).
This rule detects unauthorized access to the Google Chrome LevelDB sync data files. These files contain sensitive information, including synced passwords, and are often targeted by credential-stealing malware. The rule excludes known legitimate Chrome processes to minimize noise, alerting when an unknown or suspicious process interacts with this specific directory structure.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized processes loading sensitive Windows authentication-related DLLs, specifically those associated with Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and Windows Hello functionality. By filtering against a list of known, legitimate processes, the rule identifies non-Microsoft signed processes that may be attempting to interact with authentication modules, which is a common pattern in credential theft or token manipulation attacks.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized processes loading sensitive Windows authentication-related DLLs, specifically those associated with Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and Windows Hello functionality. By filtering against a list of known, legitimate processes, the rule identifies non-Microsoft signed processes that may be attempting to interact with authentication modules, which is a common pattern in credential theft or token manipulation attacks.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access or memory-dump activity targeting chrome.exe, consistent with extraction of the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key or wrapped identity/UV private keys used to decrypt synced passkey credentials (Golden Pass-ta-key attack). Excludes known legitimate crash-dump and diagnostic tooling (WerFault, crashpad_handler, procdump, Chrome itself).
Detects the process st.exe (identified as StealC / TrojanPSW:Win32/StealC) executing and subsequently accessing well-known browser credential store artifacts (Login Data, Cookies, key4.db, logins.json, Local State, Web Data) used to harvest stored passwords and session data from browsers.
Detects unauthorized processes accessing Discord's local storage (LevelDB) or extracted Discord_Tokens.json files, a technique commonly used by malware like TOKYOCORE to hijack user authentication sessions.
Detects a single unrecognized process combining two or more distinct PRO/ULTIMATE surveillance behaviors: webcam capture via Win32 Media Foundation, screenshot/screen-recorder file drops, and keystroke/clipboard dump file creation, within a short 15-minute window. Excludes known legitimate screen-recording, remote-support, and accessibility software.
Detects TOKYOCORE via overlap of data-theft artifact strings and persistence-mechanism strings (Tier 4 cluster)
Detects access to the Windows DPAPI master key storage directory located at '\Microsoft\Protect\' by processes other than standard system components (lsass.exe, svchost.exe, dllhost.exe). Accessing these files is a common technique used by adversaries to decrypt sensitive credentials stored on the system.
Detects unauthorized file access events targeting the Telegram Desktop AppData directory, which is a known technique for exfiltrating messenger session data and credentials. This rule filters for file access actions and is intended to exclude legitimate access by the Telegram application process itself.
Detects high-confidence BoryptGrab-lineage infostealer activity involving fake GitHub delivery indicators, known C2 infrastructure, suspicious gup.exe execution, libcurl.dll side-loading from user-writable paths, and known malicious file hashes.
Detects suspicious activity associated with credential stealers where an unsigned or unrecognized process accesses MetaMask or Exodus wallet vault/seed files, performs process injection into legitimate browser/wallet binaries, or attempts to utilize DPAPI (CryptUnprotectData) or PBKDF2 for wallet credential decryption.
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