Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to Azure AD domain federation settings or authentication methods that could indicate attempts to establish persistent access or bypass authentication controls (e.g., golden SAML attacks, domain-level backdoors). The rule monitors for successful operations related to domain federation, authentication changes, and domain management, excluding known administrative actions from internal Microsoft domains.
Detects modifications to Azure AD domain federation settings or authentication methods that could indicate attempts to establish persistent access or bypass authentication controls (e.g., golden SAML attacks, domain-level backdoors). The rule monitors for successful operations related to domain federation, authentication changes, and domain management, excluding known administrative actions from internal Microsoft domains.
Detects modifications to Azure AD domain federation settings or authentication methods that could indicate attempts to establish persistent access or bypass authentication controls (e.g., golden SAML attacks, domain-level backdoors). The rule monitors for successful operations related to domain federation, authentication changes, and domain management, excluding known administrative actions from internal Microsoft domains.
Detects modification of hybrid identity federation configuration for authentication bypass
This rule detects network traffic on TCP port 445 (SMB) containing the string 'lsasrv.dll' in a case-insensitive manner, indicating a potential attempt to modify the Domain Controller's authentication package. This activity is often associated with persistence techniques where an attacker modifies or replaces legitimate authentication packages to maintain access or elevate privileges.
This query will find when federation trust settings are changed for a domain or when the domain is changed from managed to federated authentication. Results will relate to when a new Active Directory Federated Service (ADFS) TrustedRealm object, such as a signing certificate, is added.
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
'This detection will go over the heartbeats received from the agents of Domain Controllers over the last hour, and will create alerts if the last heartbeats were received an hour ago.'
The analytic detects a suspicious computer account name change in Active Directory. It leverages Event ID 4781, which logs account name changes, to identify instances where a computer account name is changed to one that does not end with a '$'. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287, which can lead to domain controller impersonation and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges and potentially control the domain.
