Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
53 detections
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This query shows details about all approved Entra ID Governance Access Packages assignments. The results include the time the request was created and approved along with the justification text provided by the requestor and the approver.
'This detection uses Windows security events to look for users reading the local Device Identity Key (Machine Key).
This information can be correlated with other events for additional context and get to use-cases where a
machine key with a transport key together can be used to impersonate an Entra ID joined or registered machine.
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/'
This information can be correlated with other events for additional context and get to use-cases where a
machine key with a transport key together can be used to impersonate an Entra ID joined or registered machine.
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/'
'This query looks for sign ins by the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Sync account to Azure where properties about the logon are anomalous.
This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be
reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'
This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be
reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'
'This hunting query uses Application events from the "MSSQL$MICROSOFT##WID" provider to collect SQL statements run against an AD FS database (e.g Windows Internal Database (WID)).
A threat actor might want to extract the AD FS data configuration settings with a SQL statement or modify it with an UPDATE SQL statement.
In order to use this query you need to create a server audit and database audit specification on your AD FS database.
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand/blob/main/3_simulate_detect/credential-access/exportADFSTokenSigningCertificate.md
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
'
A threat actor might want to extract the AD FS data configuration settings with a SQL statement or modify it with an UPDATE SQL statement.
In order to use this query you need to create a server audit and database audit specification on your AD FS database.
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand/blob/main/3_simulate_detect/credential-access/exportADFSTokenSigningCertificate.md
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
'
'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Microsoft Entra ID Health service agents (e.g AD FS).
Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation).
This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent.
Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys. You can find more information in here https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/master/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml
'
Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation).
This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent.
Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys. You can find more information in here https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/master/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml
'
'This detection uses Security events from the "AD FS Auditing" provider to detect suspicious object identifiers (OIDs) as part EventID 501 and specifically part of the Enhanced Key Usage attributes.
This query checks to see if you have any new OIDs in the last hour that have not been seen in the previous day. New OIDs should be validated and OIDs that are very long, as indicated
by the OID_Length field, could also be an indicator of malicious activity.
In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging
'
This query checks to see if you have any new OIDs in the last hour that have not been seen in the previous day. New OIDs should be validated and OIDs that are very long, as indicated
by the OID_Length field, could also be an indicator of malicious activity.
In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging
'
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell cmdlets. AADInternals is a tool used for administering Azure AD and Office 365, which can be abused by threat actors for various attacks including reconnaissance, credential access, and impact within Azure AD or Office 365 environments. The rule specifically looks for the unique "-AADInt" string prefix in cmdlet names.
This detection identifies the creation or update of a server instance within an Azure AD Hybrid Health AD FS service using Azure Activity logs. An adversary might perform this action to create a new AD Health ADFS service and a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs, potentially bypassing the need to compromise an on-premises AD FS server. This can be achieved programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure.
This rule detects the Hybrid Connection Manager service running on a Windows endpoint. It specifically looks for Event IDs 40300, 40301, or 40302 in conjunction with keywords like 'HybridConnection', 'sb://', 'servicebus.windows.net', or 'HybridConnectionManage'. This service is used to connect on-premises resources to Azure services, and its activity could indicate legitimate cloud integration or potentially malicious use for persistence or data exfiltration.
This detection uses Azure Activity logs (Administrative category) to identify the deletion of an Azure AD Hybrid Health AD FS service instance in a tenant. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server to spoof AD FS signing logs. The health AD FS service can then be deleted after it is no longer needed via HTTP requests to Azure.
Detects the installation of the Azure Hybrid Connection Manager service by monitoring registry modifications. This service can be used to allow remote code execution from Azure functions, potentially as a method for adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate further access.
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